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The history of World War II has led many Americans to 
vie~ Benito Mussolini's Fascist Italy and Adolf Hitler's 
Nazi Germany as European variants of a single Fascist 
ideology. Ho~ever, in the early years of the Mussolini and 
Hitler regimes, the conceptual category of international 
Fascism was by not so ~ell-established, particularly ~here 
the Nazis were concerned. American and British diplomats 
stationed in Germany in the early 1930s only occasionally 
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interpreted the rising Nazi party as an offshoot of 
Fascism, but frequently referred to it as a possible form 
of or precursor of Bolshevism in Germany. Published and 
unpublished American foreign policy documents, published 
British diplomatic documents, and a wide array of secondary 
sources have contributed information showing how 
perceptions of Nazism and Bolshevism were influenced by 
matters that clouded the issues. The similarity of 
American and British views on the subjects of Bolshevism, 
Fascism, and Nazism can be attributed to the new 
understanding among the policy elites of the two nations as 
they became the leading status QaQ powers after World War 
I. The United States in particular had gone through 
tremendous organizational changes during and after the war, 
and was entering into a new era of professional and 
bureaucratized foreign policy that differed from its ad ~ 
diplomacy of the past. 
American foreign policy of the interwar period 
combined a strong interest in business expansion with a 
relative lack of desire for international political 
entanglements. American political commitments of the 
1920s, particclarly in Germany, were backed primarily by 
loans and investment, and through reparations revision 
plans designed by unofficial diplomats recruited from the 
private sector. As American financial commitments to 
Germany became more dependent on German repayment, and as 
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the Depression tightened its grip, the rise of the Nazis 
became an ever greater source of alarm. This concern was 
related not only to their unclear and ill-defined political 
ideas, but to the threat they seemingly posed to financial 
stability -- a threat that increased their resemblance to 
the Bolsheviks in the minds of many diplomatic observers. 
Various other factors were important in developing the 
Anglo-American view of Nazism as related to Bolshevism. 
These included the almost obsessive intensity of anti-
Bolshevism in the United States and Great Britain 
throughout the interwar period; the close association of 
Bolshevism with economic chaos in the minds of Anglo-
American leaders, with a concomitant tendency to see 
Bolshevism developing wherever economic chaos occurred in 
Europe; and the strong admiration for Mussolini's Italy in 
both Britain and the United States, which precluded 
possibilities of seeing much in common between Italian 
Fascism and Nazism during this period. 
Some important sources of conceptual confusion were 
inherent in the policies of Germany's post-World War I 
Weimar Republic. Leading German diplomats and politicians 
of the republic, such as Gustav Stresemann, used Anglo-
American fears of Bolshevism as a cornerstone of their 
policy to gain revisions and modifications of the harsh 
terms of the Versailles Treaty. In the early 1930s, the 
"Bolshevism bogey" was used by Ambassador Frederic Sackett, 
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a political appointee of Herbert Hoover, to get Hoover's 
attention so that he would modify reparations policy in 
favor of Sackett's friend, the embattled Chancellor 
Heinrich Bruning. The internal factions of the rising Nazi 
party, including the left-leaning wing led by Gregor 
Strasser, appeared to give some credence to the idea that 
the Nazis could harbor communistic elements. 
After Hitler's rise to the chancellorship in 1933, 
American and British observers began to note more 
resemblances between the Hitler and Mussolini regimes. 
However, many of their earlier observations about the 
similarities of Nazism and Bolshevism have validity in 
terms of the more totalitarian nature of these regimes as 
compared to Italian Fascism and its other less extreme 
variants. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
During the years 1930 to 1933 the National Socialist 
German Workers Party, a new and alarming political 
phenomenon, rose rapidly to power amid the disintegration 
of the Weimar Republic. American diplomats in Germany 
reported regularly on the activities of the Nazis, but 
their views were constrained by their own prejudices and 
experience. When reporting on the disorderly, rabble-
rousing tactics of the Nazis before they came to power, 
American diplomats in Berlin frequently used the analogy of 
Russian Bolshevism. However, diplomats serving in 
Washington and those with previous experience in Italy 
could and often did see Nazism as being related to its most 
obvious ideological source, Italian Fascism. 
The situation was somewhat different before and after 
the crucial period of 1930 to 1933. The reports of 
American military attaches in the early 1920s had remarked 
on the similarities of the Nazi Party and Mussolini's 
recently ascended Fascists, and American diplomats 
frequently compared the two regimes after Hitler took over 
as Chancellor in January 1933. Yet during 1930-33, the 
years of Nazism's climb to true national power, the 
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diplomats serving in Berlin often ignored the similarities 
of Nazism and Italian Fascism, reporting on Nazism as a 
possible offshoot of Communism, or as a destructive 
ideology that would damage Weimar society to the point that 
Communism could triumph in the ensuing chaos. 
The Berlin diplomats ignored the Italian connection 
for many reasons. Among these were the following: 
1. The fundamental differences between Nazism and Italian 
Fascism. The Nazis were rightly viewed as much more 
destructive and a greater danger than Mussolini's 
Fascists, and there were many significant differences 
between the two regimes, some of which will be 
reviewed herein. 
2. The similarities between Russian Bolshevism and 
Nazism. These did exist, and it is worth noting that 
both these ideologies were much more extreme than 
Italian Fascism, particularly during the period under 
discussion. 
3. The position of Bolshevism as a synonym for "chaos" 
in the minds of American diplomats and leaders. This 
strong aversion to Bolshevism made Americans and their 
allies, the British, particularly attuned to the 
possibility of the spread of Bolshevism in Western 
Europe. The Soviet Union's propaganda and policy of 
debt repudiation were particular concerns, and debt 
repudiation became a major concern of American 
diplomats in the chaotic financial environment of 
Weimar Germany. 
4. The favorable reaction of many American government, 
business and media leaders to Mussolini's regime. 
Although Mussolini's popularity in the United States 
declined after his 1935 invasion of Ethiopia, his 
leadership was often presented in a favorable light 
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because of his actual achievements and his unusually 
astute public relations campaign in the United States. 
The American reaction to the Nazis was more uniformly 
unfavorable from the start, and was affected by 
Hitler's relative lack of interest in influencing 
American opinion. 
5. The business-oriented emphasis of American foreign 
policy in the 1920s and early 1930s. Under the 
Republican administrations of this period, financial 
stability in Europe was a prime concern. The cycle of 
war debts and reparations payments was important not 
only to the official diplomats but to the many 
business leaders who served as unofficial diplomats 
during this period. The Nazis represented a major 
threat to this cycle and to the prompt repayment of 
debts. Their policies, when identifiable, seemed to 
have more in common with Bolshevik debt repudiation 
than with Hussolini's favorable attitude toward 
foreign investment. 
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6. The "Bolshevism bogey" as a central tenet of Weimar 
Republic foreign policy. Weimar leaders were aware of 
American and British fears of Bolshevism, and had made 
the exploitation of these fears a part of their 
strategy since the Versailles Peace Settlement. 
Throughout the 1920s, Foreign Minister Gustav 
Stresemann used the fear of creeping Bolshevism in 
Germany to help him achieve German foreign policy 
objectives. A stable, economically healthy Germany 
would be far less vulnerable to the enticements of 
communism. 
7. Ideas of national character. The American diplomats 
and press still held strong ideas of the "national 
character" of the different nations of Europe. Many 
of these ideas had to do with whether a particular 
nation was prepared for democratic self-government. 
The traditional image of the Italians as contentious, 
hot-headed Latins coincided with the view that they 
needed strong leadership such as that provided by 
Mussolini, whose virtues appeared to outweigh his 
faults. Yet in Germany, a nation much more crucial to 
American political and financial interests, a 
dictatorship appeared far more dangerous, particularly 
when accompanied by the destructive activities of the 
Nazi party. As the Germans were traditionally 
perceived in America as an orderly, decent, dependable 
5 
people, the Nazis appeared even more anomalous. The 
views of American diplomats were overwhelmingly in 
favor of maintaining the representative government of 
the Weimar Republic. Their view was that the Germans 
should be ready for self-government, although their 
experience of it was quite limited and the revival of 
the monarchy or Prussian militarism was always a 
possibility. 
8. The perception of Hitler as a man not in control of 
his party. Despite the extreme degree of control 
Hitler had over the Nazis, the actual party activities 
during the period of the Nazi rise to power included 
much that appeared to be chaotic mob activity, though 
it was actually carefully organized mob activity. 
Also, Hitler's principle of "rival authorities" led 
him to maintain wings of the party, such as that of 
Gregor Strasser, that emphasized the socialist element 
of National Socialism in order to gain votes in 
communities with leftist sympathies. The Nazis would 
espouse any kind of ideas whenever convenient to get 
votes, and this added to the confusion that already 
existed because of their lack of a coherent party 
program. Hitler was widely underestimated by 
observers of all nationalities, and given Mussolini's 
image as a "statesman" of sorts, many thought Hitler 
could never become a leader of comparable stature, and 
that he could not even control the elements of his 
existing party. 
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9. The antecedents of the diplomats themselves. American 
diplomats of the period were generally men of high 
social and economic standing and considerable 
propriety, and they were thus particularly fearful of 
Bolshevism, debt repudiation, and economic chaos. 
Hitler appeared to them as a proponent of economic 
chaos and repudiation, unlike Mussolini, who had 
worked to create a stable business climate in Italy. 
The vulgarity and violence of the Nazi party seemed 
more related to Bolshevism than to the relatively 
placid Fascist Italy of the time. Mussolini 
reinforced this by disassociating himself and Fascism 
from the worst activities of the Nazis, and by 
constantly declaring that he had saved Italy from 
Bolshevism. 
10. Personal connections between Weimar Republic leaders 
and American diplomats. The most notable example of 
this is the relationship between Chancellor Heinrich 
Brtlning and American Ambassador Frederic Sackett in 
the early 1930s. Sackett and Bruning became close 
friends, and the ambassador dedicated considerable 
energy to helping the embattled Chancellor to stay in 
office and solve the problems of the German economy. 
On more than one occasion, Sackett communicated 
7 
directly with President Hoover regarding Br8ning's 
alarm about Communism in Germany at a time when Nazis 
was the major opposition. Since Sackett was trying to 
get Hoover to hold an economic conference to help 
Bruning deal with the German reparation problem, it is 
quite plausible that Sackett and Bruning turned to the 
"Bolshevism bogey" as a more alarming threat to order 
and therefore a more effective way to get the 
attention of a President preoccupied with the domestic 
problems of the Great Depression. 
Along with the views of the American diplomats on 
Bolshevism, Fascism, and Nazism, representative views by 
British diplomats will also be included in this study. 
This is partly because of the cooperation that arose 
between the British and American leadership after World War 
I, thanks to their status as the two major status quo 
powers in the world (and in spite of their lasting naval 
and financial rivalry). While the views of American and 
British diplomats on Fascism, Nazism, and Bolshevism were 
by no means identical, there was a notable degree of 
agreement between the diplomats of the two nations 
regarding these new and baffling political phenomena. 
Also, the traditionally close British foreign policy 
elite was far more open about its views, at least among its 
own members. As D. Cameron Watt has noted: 
The British practice of conducting most of the 
debate by written records, when taken with the 
normal practice among those in constant social 
relationships with one another of confiding 
their thoughts and experiences to private 
correspondence diaries, journals and the like, 
is a gift beyond treasure to twentieth-century 
historians. (1) 
The American foreign policy elite was in some cases as 
closely connected as the one in Britain, but they did not 
always write down all their views with the same degree of 
candor. The author hopes that the additional views of the 
British diplomats will help to shed light on the American 
perceptions and increase understanding of the position of 
two established national powers confronting new and 
dangerous ideologies abroad. 
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THE ANGLO-AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND 
The First World War left behind a host of lasting 
problems, and these difficult matters -- the European war 
debts, the German reparations question, and the emergence 
of Soviet Russia --were the sources of America's interwar 
European policy concerns. The Versailles Treaty that ended 
the war had left no party satisfied, yet it demonstrated a 
sincere effort by the victor powers to "lay the basis of a 
stable and secure world while combating the forces and 
destroying the roots of bolshevism." (1) 
During the creation of the treaty, President Woodrow 
Wilson had feared for the future of Germany: 
A harsh peace he could accept; but an unjust 
peace, Wilson warned, would drive Germany into 
the hands of the Bolsheviks or engender an 
atmosphere of lasting enmity and permanent 
revenge. The president wanted Germany to pay 
for her mistakes, but he also wanted to 
reintegrate Germany into a postwar liberal 
capitalist order that would be both prosperous 
and stable. (2) 
This reintegration of Germany proved to be a most difficult 
task. The Versailles Treaty was perceived by many Germans 
as the worst kind of betrayal and defeat. As the Weimar 
Republic of 1919 to 1933 grew out of the circumstances 
surrounding the treaty, it was tainted with "complicity" in 
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the minds of many Germans. (3) To complicate matters, the 
problems of reparations and war debts were left unsolved by 
the treaty and formed the subject matter of continuing 
international disputes lasting through the 1920s and well 
into the 1930s. 
The United States had rejected the Versailles Treaty 
and Wilson's League of Nations, and seemed outwardly to 
have withdrawn from Europe's problems. This has led some 
historians to describe the interwar period as a time of 
"isolationism." However, the United States did have clear 
policy goals in Europe, which included encouraging moderate 
change and bolstering economic prosperity in order to 
prevent revolution. The underlying motivation was "fear of 
chaos." (4) In 1931, a State Department spokesman 
described "Prosperity and Peace" as the goals of American 
policy: 
They imply a prosperous world with which the 
United States shall be free to trade on terms 
of equality with the other nations, and a 
peaceful world in which the United States shall 
be free to develop its resources without 
dissipating those resources or distracting its 
statesmen in providing for immediate national 
defense. (5) 
During the interwar years, America's Republican 
administrations were deeply concerned with German 
rehabilitation and French demands for security, yet they 
also sought to balance internal and external economic 
concerns and remain aloof from European political 
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entanglements. (6) Since "international friction and 
political uncertainty were anathema to the complex network 
of high finance and big business," American policy 
supported stability wherever it could be found, in regimes 
ranging from Germany's moderate Weimar Republic to right-
wing dictatorships such as Mussolini's Fascist Italy. (7) 
Whatever the flaws of these regimes, they were 
infinitely preferable to the frightening new alternative of 
revolutionary communism. The Bolshevik Revolution in 
Russia had left a strong impression on American leaders, as 
can be seen in the postwar "Red Scare," which left the 
nation "hag-ridden by the spectre of Bolshevism" according 
to one British observer. (8) The American outrage with 
the Soviets was so persistent that the United States did 
not recognize the Soviet regime until 1933. In every 
subsequent case of European economic instability, American 
leaders saw Bolshevism as a possible and even probable 
result if economic order could not be restored. Herbert 
Hoover, who directed the European food relief program at 
the end of the war, saw full stomachs and economic 
rehabilitation as the only way to save Eastern Europe from 
"Bolshevism and rank anarchy." As he noted, "Bolshevism 
spreads like a disease, and is no respecter of national 
borders." (9) Bolshevism had horrified most Americans 
with its atheism, denial of personal liberties, and 
repudiation of debts. This was even more true of the 
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American diplomats of the period, who represented the old-
fashioned, upper-and middle-class, Ivy League element that 
had long predominated in the Foreign Service. (10) 
In the years preceding the recognition of the Soviet 
Union in 1933, American anti-communism centered upon two 
salient issues: the specter of "world revolution" and the 
Bolsheviks' repudiation of their predecessors' debts and 
treaties. In the minds of most American diplomats, there 
was no way the United States could maintain civilized 
relations with representatives 
of a group who hold it as their mission to 
bring about the overthrow of the existing 
political, economic and social order throughout 
the world and who regulate their conduct towards 
other nations accordingly. (11) 
Bolshevism constituted both an ideological and an 
economic threat to the American position in Europe. The 
ideological threat, of course, was Bolshevism's "dominating 
world revolutionary purpose. (12) American diplomats may 
have overestimated this factor, as they were disadvantaged 
by their lack of firsthand observers within the Soviet 
Union. Even when communism did not pose a serious threat 
within a given nation, the perceived threat of it kept 
American diplomats wary and also colored their perceptions 
of new ideologies such as Italian Fascism and German 
Nazism. Benito Mussolini, who came to power within five 
years of the Bolshevik Revolution, claimed to have saved 
Italy from communism. In Germany, the Weimar Republic's 
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leaders throughout the twenties were highly attuned to 
American fears of Bolshevism and used them to gain leverage 
for their own interests, even in the early 1930s when the 
Nazis constituted a far greater threat to republican 
government. 
The same fears of contagious Bolshevism colored 
American diplomatic perceptions in other areas around the 
world. The "ideological blinders" of anti-Bolshevism 
permeated the State Department and affected interpretations 
of indigenous revolutionary movements in Mexico, Central 
America, Greece and Spain. (13) Indeed, given the 
American diplomatic obsession with communism in the 1920s 
and early 1930s, almost any revolutionary ideology, whether 
it arose on the right or the left of the political 
spectrum, was bound to be interpreted in terms of 
communism. 
The second of America's great fears of Bolshevism was 
economic, and involved the Soviet Union's repudiation of 
debts incurred by previous Russian regimes. As the leading 
creditor nation of the world, the United States was bound 
to be sensitive to this breach of international goodwill 
and the example it might offer to European debtor nations. 
In a press release issued in 1923, Secretary of State 
Charles Evans Hughes expressed the State Department's 
indignation regarding this issue: 
Now what did the Soviet authorities do? In 
their Decree of January 21, 1918, they made 
this simple statement: "Unconditionally, and 
without any exceptions, all foreign loans are 
annulled." 
What was loaned to Russia out of our 
Liberty Bond proceeds, and the war loans 
obtained by Russia before the revolution to 
enable Russia to continue the war were simply 
annulled! Now the United States is not a harsh 
creditor. The United States is not seeking 
to press debtors who cannot pay beyond their 
means. But indulgence and proper arrangements 
are one thing, repudiation is quite another. (14) 
Throughout the twenties, American policy spokesmen 
vented their anger about the Soviet repudiation of debts. 
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If there had been any fear that this sort of thinking could 
spread to Italy, Mussolini soon put a stop to it. Upon 
becoming premier, he made his views clear to newsmen: "One 
must always speak well of his creditors, and we owe the 
United States money." He also noted his desire for close 
relations and an economic entente between Italy and the 
United States. (15) 
The situation looked much different in Germany when 
the Nazis began their rise to power with their phenomenal 
election victory of 1930. Their victory set off an 
immediate alarm in the minds of the American diplomats in 
Berlin, and that alarm was largely economic. (16) Not 
only had the Nazis increased their representation in the 
Reichstag from 12 to 107 seats, but the Communist Party had 
also made an impressive showing. The "extraordinarily 
confused, self-contradictory and opportunist" Nazi campaign 
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contained ominous hints of "repudiation pure and simple" of 
all foreign obligations, financial and diplomatic. The 
American charge' d'affaires in Berlin, George A. Gordon, 
decried the behavior of solid citizens who voted for the 
Nazis even though their action could only 
further impair foreign confidence -- especially 
in financial circles -- in the stability of 
German republican institutions and, in general, 
to intensify the economic and financial evils 
of which they complain. (17) 
The fear of repudiation recurred constantly in 
discussions of the Nazis throughout their rise to power in 
the early 1930s. At this time it was becoming clear to 
observers that the republic could not survive intact, yet 
no one could foresee how it would be modified or replaced. 
The Americans and their allies, the British, had invested 
wholeheartedly in the preservation of the Weimar Republic. 
Not only was the U.S. embroiled in the complicated cycle of 
German reparations and Allied war debts, but it had 
invested heavily in German governments from the Reich to 
the municipality level and in the private sector as well. 
When the Nazis began to threaten that investment with their 
dangerous rhetoric and actions, American diplomats turned 
to various models in order to try to interpret their 
confusing, exasperating, ever-changing ways. For reasons 
largely connected with their financial fears, Bolshevism 
was one of the first models they used to explain the Nazis; 
Italian Fascism, which represented a system congenial to 
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the Anglo-American status quo, would ironically be one of 
the last and least used analogies. To understand why 
Italian Fascism, one of Nazism's chief ideological sources, 
did not offer the diplomats a credible parallel with 
Nazism, it will be necessary later on in this work to 
explore the relationship between the United States and 
Mussolini's Italy in the 1920s and early 1930s. 
To understand the diplomatic reaction to Bolshevism, 
Fascism, and Nazism, it is also necessary to examine the 
backgrounds of the diplomats who did the reporting. The 
Foreign Service, like many American institutions, underwent 
a rapid expansion and professionalization after World War I 
as the United States assumed a major role on the world 
stage. 
As America entered the twenties, the nation was 
emerging from a period of upheaval that had fundamentally 
changed its values and organization. Historian Robert H. 
Wiebe has referred to the period between 1877 and 1920 as 
that of "The Search For Order," and has noted the change 
from the old America of small-town, community-based values 
to the new America of increased urbanization, bureaucracy, 
and government involvement in the nation's life at every 
level. ( 18) 
The early years of the twentieth century, commonly 
referred to as the Progressive Era, had been followed by 
the First World War, which greatly accelerated the 
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transformation of the United States from an insular nation 
to a major player on the international stage. No longer 
would America's foreign policy be merely a series of 
reactions to unrelated "incidents" abroad. The war years 
created an entrenched federal bureaucracy in both domestic 
and foreign relations, and aided in the creation of a new 
outlook: 
A bureaucratic orientation now defined a basic 
part of the nation's discourse. The values of 
continuity and regularity, functionality and 
rationality, administration and management set 
the form of problems and outlined their 
alternative solutions. (19) 
This trend toward professionalization of diplomacy had 
been helped along by the efforts of elites working to 
increase American profits and power abroad. From the 1890s 
on, these groups worked to impose "a crude order" on the 
existing rudiments of American diplomacy. Men such as John 
Hay, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, Theodore Roosevelt, and 
Alfred Thayer Mahan had fought to increase America's role 
in the world and the federal government's role in the 
creation of a coherent, lasting foreign policy. Their 
views were a major factor in creating the business-
progressive foreign policy of the interwar years: 
During the twenties a new set of public 
officials would fashion an approach out of 
the expansionist ideas of Roosevelt's coterie, 
the bureaucratic inclination of the progressives, 
and the balance-sheet philosophy of big 
business . . . . (20) 
Historians such as Ellis W. Hawley and Michael Hogan 
19 
have conceptualized this period as one of "corporatism" or 
"associationalism," drawing on the work of business 
historians such as Robert H. Wiebe and Alfred D. Chandler. 
Among the features of corporatism is a pattern that can be 
seen repeatedly in the history of American interwar 
relations with Europe; in such a system, 
elites in the private and public sector 
collaborate to guarantee stability and harmony; 
and this collaboration creates a pattern of 
interpenetration and power sharing that often 
makes it difficult to determine where one 
sector leaves off and the other begins. (21) 
The strong financial emphasis of American interwar policies 
led to numerous such private/public sector collaborations 
as the Dawes and Young Plans for German reparations 
revision, the "bailing out" of the Weimar Republic with 
American loans, and the close business-based relations with 
Mussolini's Fascist Italy. 
Meanwhile, standardization and professionalization 
were also reaching the American foreign service where only 
an "amateurish approach" had existed before. (22) This 
growth began in the 1890s and was greatly accelerated by 
World War I. By the end of the war there were five times 
as many State Department employees as there had been in 
1898. University education in world affairs, almost 
nonexistent in 1906, had mushroomed in growth by the early 
1920s, facilitating the training of a new generation of 
professional diplomats. The general public's interest in 
20 
foreign affairs also increased. A generation of 
professional foreign correspondents arose, reporting on 
European political, social and cultural affairs from a 
mature perspective, and leaving aside the light, gossipy 
emphasis of previous times. (23) 
However, American diplomacy in the 1920s and 1930s was 
still mired in its pre-World War I legacy, using "the 
concepts and methods of a small neutral nation." George F. 
Kennan, writing in 1950, looked back to this approach, 
for which I must confess a certain nostalgia 
. . . . The Department of State as it existed 
at the turn of the century, and as it still was 
in large measure in the 1920's when I entered it, 
was a quaint old place, with its law-office 
atmosphere, its cool dark corridors, its 
swinging doors, its brass cuspidors, its black 
leather rocking chairs, and the grandfather's 
clock in the Secretary of State's office. There 
was a real old-fashioned dignity and simplicity 
about it. (24) 
Important changes were occurring in the Foreign 
Service during this period, as the Rogers Act of 1924 
created a professionalized and ostensibly more equitable 
diplomatic corps. By providing pensions, travel 
allowances, higher salaries, and standardized entry 
examinations, the Rogers Act was instrumental in opening 
the diplomatic profession to new men who did not fit the 
"aristocratic generalist" model of the old-fashioned 
diplomats. This landmark piece of legislation also merged 
the diplomatic and consular services, but consular 
officers, who handled the "vital but mundane" commercial 
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matters in foreign nations, were still held in lower esteem 
by the regular diplomats, who handled the more prestigious 
political matters abroad and traditionally represented a 
higher stratum of society. The coming of the Great 
Depression in 1929 had a negative effect on the reforms of 
the Rogers Act, as diplomatic salaries, perquisites, and 
promotions were reduced. The diplomats were demoralized by 
these measures, and serving abroad became even more 
difficult for those lacking independent means. (25) 
The State Department also had to address the relative 
lack of interest in foreign policy that characterized the 
Republican presidents of the twenties and early thirties. 
Presidents Harding and Coolidge were both well-known for 
leaving diplomatic matters to be handled by the Secretary 
of State, and for not supporting the State Department in 
conflicts with Congress. President Hoover had far more 
experience and interest in foreign affairs, but was 
fettered by the need to deal with domestic problems arising 
from the Great Depression. (26) 
Within their institutional framework, Foreign Service 
officers shared many of the nativist and pro-business 
beliefs typical of America in the 1920s. They were 
strongly oriented toward maintaining a world safe for free 
trade and rational, diplomatic settlement of international 
disputes. They were suspicious of immigrants and shared 
the common prejudices against southern and eastern 
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Europeans. (27) Their views on "national character" and 
the readiness of different nationalities for democratic 
self-government colored American policy toward Mussolini's 
Italy and other right-wing regimes. 
The American diplomats were not alone in their efforts 
to preserve international stability for in the interwar 
years, American leaders discovered a much closer affinity 
with British leadership than they had felt in the past. 
The conflicts between the two nations had stretched back to 
the American Revolution and continued with the War of 1812 
and the Civil War. In the subsequent scramble for empire, 
naval supremacy and markets, the two nations had frequently 
been rivals. World War I had changed much of that. The 
United States, formerly one of the world's leading debtors, 
had become its leading creditor. European political 
instability, which had sometimes worked to the advantage of 
the United States in the past, was now anathema to American 
business interests trying to take their dollars and ideas 
around the globe. In matters of naval supremacy the old 
Anglo-American rivalry remained strong, but American and 
British leaders began to see eye-to-eye on many more issues 
than in the past. This affinity arose out of what were 
correctly perceived to be common interests -- the 
maintenance of peace and stability around the world and 
particularly in Western Europe, to ensure that business 
could be carried out efficiently by both nations. 
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The war brought more than just an end to old empires 
and a drastic change in the status of Britain and America. 
New nations and divisions of territory emerged out of the 
Versailles Treaty as the victor powers determined the 
disputed status of lands belonging to the former empires. 
The most alarming development, however, was the e~ergence 
of Bolshevik Russia, a new nation with a new ideology, 
created upon the wreckage of the old Tsarist empire. 
This new state was a threat to everything the 
Americans and the British stood for -- stability, peace, 
and expanding financial empires. The Bolsheviks proudly 
declared their desire for world revolution and refused to 
honor the debts of the Tsarist government or compensate 
individuals and corporations for the loss of their 
property. These values were so far from the prevailing 
Anglo-American views that the possible spread of Bolshevism 
became an overwhelming fear of British and American 
policymakers. This fear was manifested in many ways, some 
obvious, such as the American postwar "Red Scare" and the 
virulent anti-Bolshevism of Winston Churchill, and others 
less visible. One lesser-known way in which fears of 
Bolshevism affected policy was that of Anglo-American 
reactions to other emerging ideologies, such as Italian 
Fascism and German Nazism. (28) 
The social background of the diplomats affected their 
views on this subject to a great degree. High-ranking 
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American diplomats of the period, such as Joseph Grew, Hugh 
Gibson, and William Phillips, were members of an elite 
group of old-style diplomats who felt a natural affinity 
for the European upper classes. To these men, 
communism was anathema. As Christian gentlemen, 
the diplomats were horrified at the assault upon 
family, religion, and simple decorum that gained 
popularity with the Bolshevist revolution in 
1917 . . . . (29) 
Jay Pierrepont Moffat, a high-ranking American diplomat of 
the era, exemplified this attitude in his memories of life 
in Warsaw in the early 1920s: 
Theoretically, communism embodied a conception 
of life far more advanced than our own system, yet 
in practice it was reviving the Dark Ages. It 
required an act of faith to see a happier world 
growing out of the misery and torture and carnage 
that followed wherever the early Bolsheviks trod. 
And yet we instinctively knew that the Polish 
way of life, twentieth century feudalism however 
benevolent, was doomed to die. (30) 
The old American foreign policy elite, which was still 
very much in control in the 1920s, had its counterpart and 
model in the diplomatic elite of Great Britain. The 
British Foreign Office had itself undergone reforms in 1906 
and 1919-20, but these changes, like the American reforms, 
were a method of acknowledging expansion and changes in the 
existing elite, not a thoroughgoing opening of the 
diplomatic profession to all classes of society. (31) 
In the interwar period, there was a new emphasis on 
Anglo-American cooperation in foreign policy. During this 
period there was a common feeling, particularly among some 
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British diplomats, of a "Trans-Atlantic Anglo-Saxon 
family," exemplified by the title of Churchill's History .c..f. 
~ English-Soeaking Peoples. (32) Anglophilia had been 
strong among the older American imperialists such as 
Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan, but was 
modified somewhat by the new need to recognize and 
accommodate American power after World War I. (33) The 
United States, as creditor to the world, was now the 
"senior" partner in the Anglo-American financial 
relationship, often to the exasperation of the British 
diplomats who were forced to accede to American whims. 
As one British policy statement noted, 
The American characteristics of emotionalism, 
ignorant irresponsibility in high place, 
and -- lower -- whirlwind press campaigns, 
abide. Nor can dispassionate review overlook on 
the one hand a certain commercial imperialism, 
on the other a new superiority which ... tends 
to promote a slightly aggressive expectation --
often confirmed -- of having things one's own 
way. ( 34) 
Another British diplomat complained profusely about 
the problems of dealing with the Americans, but recognized 
the inevitability of cooperation with them: 
Politically, with their natural tendency to 
isolation and their relative remoteness from 
European problems, it can hardly be denied that 
the United States stand to gain less from our 
friendship than we do from theirs. . . . Finan-
cially, we are unquestionably more dependent 
on the United States than the United States 
are upon us. (35) 
The Americans had considerable control over the 
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relationship because of their newfound money and power, but 
the British still saw themselves as the senior partners in 
terms of judgment and expertise: 
With our older traditions and wider experience 
it should be possible here to take a longer and 
steadier view . . . . Americans are notoriously 
hasty and impetuous in their judgments and the 
actual advantages which they derive from good 
relations with Great Britain are patent only to 
a relatively small and thoughtful minority. (36) 
Bitter battles erupted between the two nations during 
the interwar period, particularly regarding questions of 
naval supremacy. (37) Yet there was also a sense of 
shared Anglo-American objectives, often in opposition to 
the policy objectives of the French, the Germans, and other 
Europeans. This was reinforced by a new sense of kinship 
between the American and British policymaking elites and a 
new sense of equality on the part of the American leaders. 
Speaking of the patrician Secretary of State Henry L. 
Stimson, one biographer notes that "Stimson and those who 
shared his education and background instinctively thought 
themselves the equals of the British and the superiors of 
everyone else." In keeping with this kind of thinking, 
American Ambassador to England Alanson B. Houghton, in a 
conversation with British Foreign Minister Austen 
Chamberlain, even quoted Kipling on "the difference between 
the great Anglo-Saxon nations and 'the lesser folk without 
the law'. (38) 
In the period after World War I, the British and 
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American upper classes strengthened their ties in banking, 
law, diplomacy, and academia through such institutions as 
the Rhodes Scholarships and the Pilgrims' Society, 
established to bring together opinion-makers from both 
nations for charitable and political enterprises. The 
British, embattled by problems throughout their worldwide 
empire, found support among the American diplomats, with 
whom they often developed personal friendships: 
The interwar period was the time when the tight, 
sharply defined ruling class in England and its 
more diffuse but still recognizable counterpart 
in the United States, after a century of mutual 
dislike, began to make friends. Very often 
they did so as individuals. (39) 
For example, Sir Ronald Graham, the British Ambassador 
to Italy, spoke of his American counterpart, Henry 
Fletcher, as having "shrewd judgment" representative of 
"the best opinion here," and being "entirely of my way of 
thinking" regarding questions of Mussolini's ambitions. 
R.L. Craigie, a leading British diplomat in 
Washington, noted that he and William Castle, the mercurial 
Assistant Under-Secretary for Western European Affairs, 
were "old friends." (40) In the highest levels of the 
diplomatic service, Sir Esme Howard, the British ambassador 
in Washington from 1906-08 and 1924-1930, had many friends 
among the "Eastern establishment" of the day, including 
James Garfield, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and former Secretary 
of State Elihu Root, all close friends of Secretary of 
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State Stimson. As an "Atlanticist" and admirer of American 
inventiveness, Howard was very aware of the role Anglo-
American cooperation could play in maintaining peace and 
security around the world. His highly successful tenure as 
ambassador demonstrated that British interests could be 
best served by a man who already commanded the friendship 
and attention of many members of the American elite. (41) 
The British and American elites "shared tastes, values 
and prejudices." (42) This was certainly true of their 
parallel responses to Bolshevism 1 which horrified the 
British leadership for many of the same reasons as it did 
the Americans. As one British diplomat plainly stated, 
... the Bolsheviks consistently and delib-
erately set at nought a whole number of principles 
which we consider essential in right thinking 
communities: they repudiate debts and they engage 
in propaganda. (43) 
The British maintained a more cordial posture towards the 
Soviets than did the Americans, but their citizens had 
major uncompensated losses that were a source of lasting 
animosity. In 1929 1 these losses were estimated at~180 
million for nationalized properties~ ~0 million in 
repudiated pre-war State and municipal securities, d(35 
million in confiscated property and money, and a Russian 
war debt to Britain of~BOO million. (44) 
Back in England, trade unions went on strike against 
British support of the anti-Bolshevik White Russian forces, 
and leading Conservative politicians such as Winston 
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Churchill railed against Communism. The British did not 
normalize relations with Russia until 1924. Many British 
Conservatives exhibited "an exaggerated fear of domestic 
communism" that furthered their desire to isolate the 
Soviets, and they persisted in seeing the Communists as the 
chief danger to international security even well after the 
advent of the Nazis. In much the same way as the 
Americans, the British wanted to isolate Russia, and thus 
supported the Weimar Republic as a bulwark against Russian 
expansion ism. ( 45) 
While the United States persisted in non-recognition of 
the Soviet Union until 1933, British relations with the 
USSR "fluctuated between uneasy co-operation and open 
hostility," reaching a nadir in 1927 when the British broke 
off diplomatic relations after discovering evidence of 
espionage and subversion by Arcos, the Soviet trading 
organization. British exports to the USSR fell fromct36 
million in 1925 toaf11 million in 1928. Relations were 
reopened in 1929, but suspicion and hostility still colored 
the relationship. (46) 
The British, like the Americans, were openly devoted 
to the preservation of peace, the status quo, and their own 
commercial interests on an international level. (47) 
A leading British saw these objectives as leaving them 
"diametrically opposed" to the policies of the outlaw 
Bolshevik nation: 
British policy aims at securing the safety 
of the Empire and the promotion of its trade, 
upon which its life and prosperity are based. 
For this purpose we are working everywhere for 
peace and settlement, with a view to achieve a 
return to normal economic conditions. Russian 
policy, on the other hand, aims at the estab-
lishment of communism, which it can only achieve 
by the destruction of the present order of 
things. To promote this revolution it aims at 
fomenting disturbance and disorder 
everywhere. (48) 
As in the American case, British hostility toward 
Communism was matched by comfortable relations with 
Mussolini's Fascist Italy, which appeared, despite its 
problematic aspects, to be a valuable ally in the 
preservation of the status quo. Sir Austen Chamberlain, 
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head of the Foreign Office, wrote proudly of his "personal 
relationship" with Mussolini. (49) He believed, as did 
the Americans, that Mussolini had redeemed Italy from 
"political corruption, social anarchy, industrial strife 
and national degeneracy" and had given "a new life and a 
new standing to Italy." (50) He was not alarmed by 
Mussolini's sometimes bellicose rhetoric, which he felt was 
only bluff and attention-seeking: 
Signor Mussolini's methods are sometimes a 
little rough; he is apt to fancy a slight and 
to go off at a tangent, but I have found him 
a man of his word, and we have settled without 
any serious difficulty two or three questions 
which in other hands might have given rise to a 
serious crisis. {51) 
Sir Ronald Graham, the British Ambassador to Italy, 
acknowledged the worst aspects of Mussolini's regime in the 
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area of personal liberties, yet insisted that "the good 
outweighs the evil" and that Mussolini was bringing 
"progress and development to millions of people." (52) In 
the British view, the Italians were "nationally inclined to 
disobedience of the law" and had a "national inaptitude for 
organization." The emergence of Mussolini, who was 
developing Italian industry and transportation and 
"stamping out communism," seemed a blessing. An added 
bonus was the "loyalty and goodwill" of Mussolini's capable 
Foreign Minister, Dino Grandi, with whom high-ranking 
British and American diplomats, such as Sir Ronald Graham 
and Henry L. Stimson, felt very much at ease. Grandi noted 
the new sense of Anglo-American unity and the cordial 
treatment he received from both nations. Good relations 
were further enhanced by Grandi's successful visit to the 
United States in 1931 and his appointment as Mussolini's 
minister to Great Britain in 1932. (53) 
While American business and diplomatic relations 
flourished in Italy, the nation became ever more isolated 
from the new regime in Russia. Under the tutelage of 
Robert F. Kelley, the rabidly anti-Bolshevik chief of 
Eastern European affairs, aspiring American Foreign Service 
officers were educated in the ways of the old Russia, and 
"the perspective that the Soviets had destroyed all that 
was of value in Russian life" would color the views of 
State Department Soviet experts for years to come. (54) 
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These views helped delay the recognition of the Soviet 
Union despite the widespread sympathy of American 
intellectuals toward the Soviet experiment and the 
increasing demands of businessmen, particularly after 1927, 
to expedite trade with Russia through recognition of the 
Soviet government. (55) 
The prevailing atmosphere of continuing isolation from 
the Soviet Union only intensified fears and suspicions of 
communism. Before the Americans recognized the Soviet 
Union in 1933, nearly all of their information on Russia 
came from an observation post in Riga, Latvia, manned by 
newly trained experts on Russia, such as George Kennan and 
Charles Bohlen. The city of Riga itself provided few 
insights into the new Bolshevik regime, for as Kennan 
described it, "To live in Riga was ... in many respects 
to live in Tsarist Russia--it was, in fact, almost the only 
place where one could still live in Tsarist Russia." (56) 
The American "Soviet Service" was opposed to 
recognition. Their perceptions, dubbed the "Riga Axioms" 
by one historian, were highly influential in American 
policy. They included the view that the Soviet Union 
demanded expansion and further revolution, and always 
created its foreign policy through "ideology and conscious 
intentions," never by accident. (57) These views played a 
role in American reaction to the European political 
upheaval of the interwar years and continued to influence 
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American policy well into the years of the Cold War. 
American diplomats shared a "liberal-internationalist 
concept of international relations" which put a high 
priority on free commercial relations and respect for 
public opinion, values that had been repudiated to a great 
extent by the fledgling Soviet Union. (58) In Italy, 
Mussolini remained attuned to these American priorities, 
but Hitler disregarded them from the start, and this 
inevitably affected American diplomatic views regarding 
these two regimes. (59) 
An overwhelming emphasis on commercial relations 
colored American foreign policy throughout the 1920s and 
early 1930s. The old-fashioned diplomats, with their Ivy 
League background, held a certain disdain for business 
(60), but the pre-Depression faith in business and 
businessmen carried over from domestic policy into the 
field of international relations. Herbert Feis, the State 
Department's Economic Adviser from 1931 to 1943, has noted 
that "during the decade of the twenties, the dollar figured 
large in our relations with other nations. We acted as 
banker to the whole needy world ... " with private capital 
providing funds and the United States government involved 
in the operations. (61) 
This move to financially-oriented diplomacy set the 
tone for American diplomacy for this entire period. 
Diplomats, bankers and businessmen worked toward the same 
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goals, sharing "a common set of assumptions concerning the 
inseparability of American economic progress, world peace, 
and European economic and political stability." They saw 
German recovery as essential to European prosperity, 
American economic growth, and the restriction of Bolshevist 
expansion. However, Germany's needs had to be balanced 
against the French concern for security and the Allied 
desire for German reparation payments. The Americans 
produced a "corporatist" solution which delegated the 
settlement of European financial matters to "experts" from 
the American business world, all in an effort to stabilize 
Europe's economy while not getting overinvolved in its 
politics. (62) 
The prevailing disillusionment following World War I 
had produced a marked change from Wilsonian 
internationalism to the semi-isolationism of the 1920s. In 
December 1920, Wilson's last State of the Union address 
championed America's mission as an example of democracy in 
a world shaken by the Bolshevik Revolution (63), yet six 
months later, President Harding's address to Congress 
emphasized America's rejection of the League of Nations and 
expressed a pragmatic, distant attitude toward Europe and 
its problems: 
We can be helpful because we are moved by no 
hatreds and harbor no fears. Helpfulness 
does not mean entanglement, and participation 
in economic adjustments does not mean sponsorship 
for treaty commitments which do not concern us, 
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and in which we will have no part. (64) 
"Economic adjustments" in Europe were at the center of 
Republican foreign policy in the twenties. Many historians 
have noted the American avoidance of political 
entanglements coupled with a willing intervention in 
European economic policy, often using "unofficial" 
diplomats from the business world as its agents. (65) The 
Dawes and Young plans for revision of reparations were 
examples of this type of diplomacy, which was praised by 
President Coolidge in 1924: 
The attitude which our Government took and 
maintained toward an adjustment of European 
reparations, by pointing out that it was not 
a political but a business problem, has 
demonstrated its wisdom by its actual results. 
We desire to see Europe restored that it may 
resume its productivity in the increase of 
industry and its support in the advance of 
civilization. We look with great gratification 
at the hopeful prospect of recuperation in 
Europe through the Dawes plan. Such assistance 
as can be given through the action of the public 
authorities and of our private citizens, through 
friendly counsel and cooperation, and through 
economic and financial support . . . should be 
unhesitatingly provided. (66) 
Over the course of the 1920s, it became apparent that 
the reparations problem was part of a larger European 
pattern of change and conflict that could not be dismissed 
as simply a "business problem." However, in the early 
interwar period, the United States still held faith in the 
ability of American financial strength to help maintain 
stability in Europe. Over the years this proved to be 
untrue in Weimar Germany, but it seemed to work well in 
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CHAPTER III 
MUSSOLINI AND THE AMERICANS 
Italy, along with most European nations, had suffered 
tremendous losses and devastation in World War I. During 
and after the war, a possible triumph of Bolshevism in 
Italy had been a major American fear, and the Americans 
moved to protect their wartime allies, the Italians. State 
Department fears of "a second Russia" in Italy led the 
Committee on Public Information to conduct an extraordinary 
propaganda campaign designed to promote the goals of 
Wilsonian democracy. The CPI even offered financial 
support at this time to Benito Mussolini, who had not yet 
developed Fascism and was still "a prewar, moderate 
socialist editor ... the type of leader the Americans 
hoped to use in building a reformist middle alternative to 
the reactionaries on the right and the revolutionaries on 
the left." ( 1) 
The CPI and its propaganda machinery were disbanded in 
1919, and Wilson's phenomenal popularity in Italy declined 
when he opposed Italian territorial demands at Versailles. 
However, Wilson's "brief but intense interlude" of 
popularity had helped fight off the threat of radical 
revolution in Italy. It "illustrated the difficulty in 
finding a middle path in Europe's polarized politics," a 
problem that the United States would also face repeatedly 
in the 1920s in Germany's Weimar Republic. (2) 
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In Italy, however, a new regime arose that solved the 
problem of polarization by creating a one-party political 
system. On October 29, 1922, Mussolini became Prime 
Minister of Italy, toppling one of the many weak and short-
lived parliamentary governments of the postwar period. His 
victory was achieved by the threat of an insurrection of 
his bands of Fascist blackshirts, the sguadristi; by the 
timidity of King Vittorio Emanuele III, who refused to 
fight the threatened insurrection, and through the 
illusions of parliamentary leaders who thought Mussolini 
could be "tamed" by bringing him into the cabinet. 
The king's assent to the takeover was quiet and 
undramatic, but Mussolini, an experienced journalist and 
propagandist, wanted to enter office with a gesture that 
would appear memorable and forceful. Thus arose the myth 
of the "March on Rome," with Mussolini and 30,000 armed 
Fascists presenting an "ultimatum" to the king. The 
reality was somewhat different -- there were far fewer than 
30,000 men, and Mussolini reached Rome in a private 
sleeping car, but the myth endured and provided a model for 
Hitler's attempted "Beer Hall Putsch" of 1923. (3) 
Another favorite myth of Mussolini's was that by 
forcefully taking control, he had saved Italy from imminent 
Bolshevism that would have otherwise wrested control from 
the weak, divided parliamentary government. This was 
46 
untrue --by 1922 the worst postwar labor troubles were over 
in Italy and Bolshevism was an unlikely development--but 
the myth served Mussolini well and would continue to do so 
for many years. (4) 
Fascism was an ideology created through action and 
experimentation, and patriotic anti-Bolshevism had 
certainly been one of its strongest original elements. (5) 
Virulent anti-communists such as Winston Churchill praised 
the new leader's efforts to counteract communist 
revolutionary movements, and American political leaders, 
who were just emerging from the Red Scare of 1919-20, found 
his anti-communism equally praiseworthy. (6) 
Within weeks of the March on Rome, Mussolini told the 
American ambassador that Italy would be privatizing its 
utilities and railways, and that Americans would be 
included in the opportunities this change offered. 
Mussolini also wanted Italy to control its destiny "by 
economic cooperation but with independence of political 
entanglements," a system in perfect keeping with the 
American foreign policy objectives of the time --economic 
ties without political entanglements. (7) 
Throughout his career, Mussolini took credit for 
saving Italy from imminent Bolshevism. In typically florid 
style, the American edition of Mussolini's ghost-written 
"autobiography" explained the creation of Fascism as 
follows: 
The old parties clung in vain to the rattling 
programmes. These parties had to make pitiful 
repairs and tinkerings in an attempt to adapt 
their theories as best they could to the new 
days. It was therefore not sufficient to 
create -- as some have said superficially --
an anti-altar to the altar of socialism. It 
was necessary to imagine a wholly new political 
conception, adequate to the living reality 
of the twentieth century, overcoming at the 
same time the ideological worship of liberalism, 
the limited horizons of various spent and 
exhausted democracies, and finally the violently 
Utopian spirit of Bolshevism. (8) 
Many American and British diplomats agreed. The American 
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ambassador to London welcomed Mussolini's ascent in 1922 as 
"the death blow to Bolshevism." In 1926, the virulently 
anticommunist Undersecretary of State, William Castle, 
welcomed the prospect of pro-Mussolini writings by 
muckraker Ida Tarbell after her visit to Italy: " . . if 
she should write articles which see the good in the Fascist 
regime, it will do away with a lot of subversive talk that 
goes on here." (9) 
As these views demonstrate, Hussolini's ascent to 
power was greeted with a general approbation entirely 
unlike the alarm that accompanied Hitler's rise to power a 
decade later. This was partly owing to one of the major 
differences between the two leaders: Mussolini made a 
point of courting foreign public opinion while Hitler, a 
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master of propaganda within Germany, appeared to attribute 
little or no importance to the way foreigners, and 
particularly Americans, viewed him and his movement. 
Mussolini received little attention from American 
diplomatic and press observers before the March on Rome, 
doubtless because of his largely unknown status as a leader 
and the lesser importance of Italy as a focus of American 
concerns. By the time Americans began paying attention to 
Mussolini, his rule in Italy was a fait accompli. Hitler's 
rise to power, however, took a decade from the time of the 
Beer Hall Putsch to his assumption of the chancellorship, 
and he was the object of largely unfavorable international 
attention throughout that period. With his inflammatory 
rhetoric and offensive statements, his philosophy appeared 
to be that any publicity was good publicity, and his work 
as a destabilizing force in Germany, the central nation in 
American efforts for European recovery, guaranteed him 
negative international notoriety. 
Mussolini, however, worked constantly to make sure the 
worldwide attention aimed at him would be largely 
favorable. His first meeting with the American ambassador 
after taking office as Prime Minister is a notable example. 
Not only did Mussolini break with protocol by taking the 
trouble to pay a visit to the American ambassador instead 
of vice versa, but he also made a point of letting him know 
that his government would be offering valuable trade 
concessions to the Americans at the first possible 
opportunity. (10) In December 1922 1 after a meeting to 
discuss the important issue of Italian immigration to the 
United States, the American charge' in Rome observed that 
"Mussolini is distinctly friendly in his attitude toward 
us. (11) 
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From the start, foreign policy was Mussolini's primary 
emphasis. At first, he disclaimed any interest in foreign 
imperialism or the export of Fascism, though he belied this 
with his abortive takeover of the Greek island of Corfu in 
1923 and his continuing financial and advisory support of 
Fascist movements around the world, including Italian-
American fascists in the United States and the early Nazis 
in Germany. By April 1925, Fascist movements were 
estimated to exist in forty countries, and many of them --
including Hitler's early Nazis in Bavaria -- were supported 
by Italian arms shipments and diplomatic activity. (12) 
In the years immediately following the March on Rome, 
the new Italian Fascist regime was greeted with widespread 
approbation by much of the American public, press, and 
diplomatic corps. These views fluctuated over the years, 
and would change markedly with the 1935 invasion of 
Ethiopia and Mussolini's later cooperation with the Nazis. 
However, throughout the twenties and well into the 
thirties, Mussolini appeared to be a leader the Americans 
could tolerate if not embrace. Secretary of State Henry L. 
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Stimson observed in his memoirs that the Italians were "the 
least difficult" of all the Continental Powers in 1931 and 
1932. This changed after 1935 when Mussolini "deserted the 
ranks of the peacemakers," but at the time the Italians 
appeared as a valuable ally and Stimson found Hussolini "a 
sound and useful leader" willing to comply with orderly 
processes in foreign policy. (13) 
The American liberal and "highbrow" press took a 
different view of Fascism, and regularly attacked Mussolini 
for numerous offenses. Among these offenses were military 
impressment of Italian-American visitors to Italy, Fascist 
propaganda activities in the United States, expansionist 
rhetoric, repression of freedom of speech and the press, 
and the politically motivated murder of Socialist leader 
Giacomo Matteotti in 1924, which was followed by a period 
of increased repression and consolidation of Fascist 
rule. (14) 
The American business press, however, lionized 
Mussolini in the early years of his regime. This was an 
important source of support during the twenties, a period 
when businessmen ''enjoyed a virtual monopoly on the 
imagination and rhetoric of the American people . . . . 
Banker Lewis E. Pierson, the president of the Merchants 
Association of New York, praised the Fascists for their 
emphasis on "thrift and hard work," their purging of 
inefficiency and incompetence in government, and their 
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return of railroads and public utilities to private 
enterprise. He also noted that "in place of the false and 
dangerous ideas of communism they have substituted the 
ideals of individualism." (15) 
In the United States, many were happy to see the 
Italians under Mussolini embracing such traditionally 
American virtues as hard work and thrift. One American 
perception of the Italians had always been that of a 
disorderly people, "an 'inferior,' indolent and debauched 
people" unprepared for the rigors of American-style 
democracy. Herbert Hoover, in his book Challenge LQ 
Liberty, observed that "the concept of Liberty had never 
been strongly developed in the Italian people." Edgar 
Ansel Mowrer, a veteran correspondent for the Chicago Daily 
~ and a great admirer of the Italians and their culture, 
nonetheless described their politics as follows: 
"Normal" Italy is an easy-going paternalistic 
country, colored by indolence, veined with 
favoritism, streaked with cheating and graft, 
peaceful, unprogressive, parasitical, where 
success generally comes by cunning or 
crookedness or the possession of influential 
friends, governed by old men through an old-
fashioned, over centralized, monstrously 
ramified bureaucracy that chokes individual 
initiative. 
Not only were the Italians incapable of self-government, 
Mowrer insisted, they did not even want it: "The Italian 
people has never desired real self-government, and has 
possessed only the bare semblance of it." {16) 
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While Mowrer offered a guarded acceptance of the early 
Mussolini regime, other Americans were more openly 
enthusiastic. In fact, one strength of Mussolini's regime 
was his astute understanding of American and British values 
and his extraordinarily successful propaganda efforts among 
Anglo-American journalists, diplomats, and observers from 
all categories of society. One of Mussolini's leading 
admirers was Richard Washburn Child, Ambassador to Italy 
between 1920 and 1924, who became a member of the Italian 
Fascist Party and later ghost-wrote and provided a foreword 
for the American edition of Mussolini's "autobiography." 
In this foreword, Child was full of effusive praise for 
Mussolini's physical energy and down-to-earth pragmatism, 
and offered several comparisons between Ll ~and Child's 
own hero, Theodore Roosevelt. (17) As a self-declared 
Theodore Roosevelt liberal, Child saw in Mussolini a man of 
action to match his own mentor in organizing political 
unity "not around rights but around duties." In his view, 
Mussolini's new system expressed the will of the Italian 
people. It also emphasized a balanced budget, hard work, 
service, and loyalty. Most of all, it worked, and this was 
a tremendous appeal to traditional American pragmatic 
liberalism: 
When Italy was staggering around after the war 
the only thing which worked was Italian Fascism 
and Mussolini; to deny it is like denying the 
existence of the first day in every month. (18) 
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Other progressives echoed this same admiration for 
Mussolini's effectiveness and his resemblance to the 
classic American "man of action", Theodore Roosevelt. 
·H. Nelson Gay's Strenuous Italy, whose very title hints at 
the connection with Roosevelt's philosophy of the 
"strenuous life," lauded Hussolini's successes as 
"primarily and fundamentally social and economic." Using 
heavily statistical source material, the author noted 
Fascism's achievements in education, trade, public health, 
and other favorite target areas of progressive reformers, 
and praised Hussolini for being "as practical, 
nationalistic and determined as was Theodore Roosevelt." 
(19) 
Hussolini seemed in some ways to embody that American 
progressive ideal, the "public man," whom Robert Wiebe has 
described as 
.a unique and indispensable leader. Al-
though learned enough to comprehend the details 
of a modern, specialized government, he was 
much more than an expert among experts. His 
vision encompassed the entire nation, his 
impartiality freed him from all prejudices, and 
his detached wisdom enabled him to devise an 
equitable and progressive policy for the whole 
society . . . . Because he could best determine 
where and how the government should expand or 
contract, he should have the broadest discre-
tionary power, including the right to bend 
unnecessarily rigid constitutional limitations. 
Wiebe noted that Mussolini appealed strongly to the faction 
of progressives who thought primarily in terms of 
efficiency and economy, and he shared the traits of 
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"effervescence," showmanship and "insatiable ambition for 
power" that had characterized Theodore Roosevelt, a man who 
had considerably expanded the powers of the American 
presidency. (20) 
The impression of Mussolini as a dashing man of action 
was carefully nurtured by Margherita Sarfatti, a leading 
Italian writer, art critic, and the longest-lasting of 
Mussolini's many mistresses. Signora Sarfatti, with her 
journalistic skills, social prominence and excellent 
command of English, was one of Mussolini's key contacts 
with foreign journalists and diplomats. She wrote ~ ~ 
Qf Benito Mussolini, an adulatory biography in English, in 
response to interest in Mussolini by an English publisher. 
The book, published in 1925, sold extremely well in England 
and the United States, and was republished with some 
changes in an Italian-language edition called ~ (the 
Latin form of ~), which became a cornerstone of the 
Mussolini mythology. Sarfatti insisted that the Italians 
were of all nations the most addicted to hero worship, but 
the image of Mussolini she chose to portray in ~ was also 
surprisingly close to the ideal American Progressive "man 
of action." She even portrayed Mussolini's personal 
aloofness and opportunism as the traits of "an uncommon, 
exceptional man --a strong, ruthless leader who stood apart 
from ordinary human weakness." The images chosen to 
accompany the text were also chosen to give the impression 
of a fearless, relentless man of action: 
The photographs that ~ offered were designed 
to suggest a range of talents beyond the 
abilities of most men. These included not 
only his roles as party activist, soldier, 
newspaper writer, or Fascist Duce, but also as 
prime minister and world statesman. Margherita 
was also careful to portray Mussolini as a 
vigorous and courageous man of action, the 
master of horses, airplanes, sports cars, and 
speedboats. ( 21) 
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This image -- later imitated by Hitler -- fit well with the 
"virility impulse" of certain sectors of the American 
progressive movement, "an exaggerated concern with 
manliness and its conventional concomitants -- power and 
activity" as symbolized in Theodore Roosevelt's charge up 
San Juan Hill and the nationalist/imperialist goals of such 
men as Albert Beveridge, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Alfred 
Thayer Mahan. To those Americans who continued to admire 
order, discipline and efficiency above all, Mussolini in 
his early years appeared to be a fine example of this 
ethic. ( 22) 
Journalists as well as diplomats were on the receiving 
end of Mussolini's flattery and manipulation. During this 
period, American foreign correspondence and diplomacy were 
coming of age, but so were the techniques of modern 
international propaganda. Mussolini's skill as a mythmaker 
and propagandist made him an early leader among the 
practitioners of the 20th-century art of image management, 
and thus "journalism and public relations were the most 
essential of all professional activities under Fascism." 
(23) According to one historian of American foreign 
correspondents, "The first extensive postwar effort at 
government news manipulation occurred in the press's 
encounter with Benito Mussolini." (24) 
Ll ~ was notorious for bribing correspondents to 
get favorable coverage, and for expelling those who 
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attacked him, as well as for charming away the doubts of 
many interviewers, particularly the female ones. Mussolini 
granted numerous interviews over the years, and it is 
sometimes difficult to account for the amount of adulation 
he received from astute observers who should have known 
better. In any case, he always made good copy for 
journalists by keeping them guessing and occasionally by 
shocking them. (25) 
Yet it is also crucial to understand the mindset with 
which American observers, diplomats and correspondents 
alike, faced European politics and Fascism's role within 
these politics. In Italy and Germany, the Americans were 
dealing with two nations largely lacking the foundations of 
representative government. Neither nation had been unified 
until the 1870s, both were ridden with regional tensions 
going back centuries. Both were also dominated by fiercely 
partisan multiparty politics, a tradition alien to the 
American two-party system. 
While freely acknowledging America's cultural 
inferiority to Europe~ reporters were baffled by the 
intricacies of European politics: 
Despite their disappointment with the United 
States, most reporters, even those who had 
matured professionally on the seamy corruption 
of urban government at home, were unprepared 
for the relentless, life-and-death clash of 
interests and national rivalries they found 
in the Old World. Reactions ranged from hasty 
idealization of the men and movements seeming 
to offer new directions for a war-weary~ 
disillusioned age~ to cynicism and disgust 
at entrenched selfishness~ greed, or reaction. 
Although they may not have recognized it, most 
of the journalists were too deeply imbued with 
progressive American assumptions about the 
virtues of compromise and adaptation to change 
to come easily to terms with Europe's ingrained, 
distrustful politics. (26) 
"Progressive" is a key word here because Progressive 
57 
thought remained an important influence during this period 
and contributed to the American admiration for Mussolini, 
as well as support of the Weimar Republic in Germany. 
Mussolini, as we have already seen, was frequently compared 
to that consummate progressive, Theodore Roosevelt. 
Journalist Edgar Ansel Mowrer, a man with serious doubts 
about Fascism (and later a leading opponent of the Nazis), 
nevertheless refused to dub Mussolini a reactionary, 
describing his regime as "a kind of Tory democracy or 
benevolent Rooseveltian idea of prosperous masses, 
individualism, militarism and a strong state all 
harmonized." (27) The overwhelming view seemed to be that 
whatever its imperfections, Mussolini's Fascist Italy was a 
nation that could and should be conciliated. The Americans 
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also worked to keep the Italian-American relationship on a 
favorable footing. (28) 
Thanks to the careful efforts of Mussolini, Margherita 
Sarfatti and other leading Fascists, the regime's control 
of American correspondents was unprecedented. The three 
leading journalists for American newspapers in Rome all 
became eventual agents of the regime. While many of the 
foreign correspondents in Rome were "police spies and 
hacks," these reporters were men of considerable 
reputation: Salvatore Cortesi of the Associated Press; 
Arnalda Cortesi (his son) of the ~~Times, and Thomas 
B. Morgan, the head of the Rome Bureau of the United Press. 
Morgan became the "compulsory point of contact" for any 
American besides diplomats who wished to meet with 
Mussolini. (29) 
Sarfatti herself edited a series of articles for 
Mussolini that appeared in the newspapers of William 
Randolph Hearst's American newspaper chain from 1931 to 
1933. Although Hearst considered Fascism unsuited to 
American values, he far preferred Fascism to Bolshevism, 
which he saw as the only other likely alternative in 
Europe. Hearst maintained close relations with British 
Fascists and was even one of the most dedicated American 
admirers of Hitler until well into the 1930s. (30) The 
articles in the Hearst press gave Mussolini a direct access 
to a Sunday circulation of 5.7 million in an American 
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population of about 124 million in 1931, and may have 
reached up to one third of adult Americans. (31) 
Fascism's detractors sometimes found it hard to 
·dispute its impressive achievements. Nicholas Murray 
Butler, President of Columbia University and a leading 
figure in the Republican party, saw Fascism as the 
strongest and most alarming challenger to liberal 
democracy, but could not deny "the stupendous improvement 
which Fascism has brought in the order, the safety, the 
health, the education, the comfort, and the satisfaction of 
the Italian people." Describing the postwar "anarchy" in 
Italy, as had other writers, he noted an alarming trend: 
... anarchy, bankruptcy, moral powerlessness, 
had apparently seized upon that great people. 
They attributed it to their imitation of our 
institutions, to our philosophy of life and of 
government. Our English and French and American 
democracy was held responsible by them for their 
own downfall, and they set about remedying it 
in most extraordinary fashion. (32) 
After Butler's 1927 speech praising Mussolini, he 
received an invitation to meet with the ~ in Rome to 
discuss his views. After meeting with Mussolini, Butler 
became an enthusiastic friend and supporter though he 
retained internationalist values that conflicted with those 
of the Italian leader. Mussolini gave strong support to 
the Casa Italiana, Columbia's newly opened institute for 
the study of Italian culture, and Butler's friendship with 
Mussolini and later Margherita Sarfatti provided the 
Italian leaders with introductions to many members of 
America's highest political and diplomatic circles. (33) 
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Breckinridge Long, Roosevelt's ambassador to Rome 
after 1933, also became a close associate of Mussolini and 
Sarfatti. Long became a fan of the regime despite its 
secret police, controlled press, and the constant espionage 
he had to tolerate at the embassy. He and Alexander King, 
the charge d'affaires in Rome, both became close associates 
of Sarfatti. (34) When Sarfatti made her first trip to 
the United States in 1934, she was received as an 
unofficial consort of Mussolini and carried letters of 
introduction from Ambassador Long to present to President 
Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Undersecretary 
of State William Phillips, and other leading Washington 
figures. (35) 
Roosevelt and Mussolini had begun secret contacts 
in late 1932, and Mussolini hoped for a special 
relationship with the newly elected President. He even had 
hopes that Roosevelt would follow the example of 
Mussolini's "corporate state" -- and indeed, some of 
Roosevelt's detractors felt that he did so in creating the 
New Deal. (36) The Depression had intensified in 1932, 
and some Americans began searching for an alternative that 
would spare them the vicissitudes of unbridled capitalism 
without succumbing to the brutal excesses of Communism. To 
many, Mussolini's corporate state seemed to offer that 
example -- a collection of state-run groups of owners, 
managers and workers that could control the economy, 
mediate disputes, and give the nation a centrally planned 
economy. ( 37) 
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As the Depression raised questions about traditional 
free-market capitalism, it also led many to question 
traditional representative politics. Was Anglo-Saxon style 
liberal democracy outmoded? Throughout the twenties, 
leading American liberals such as Walter Lippmann, Herbert 
Croly and Charles Beard had concluded that democracy was 
unworkable even in America, and H.L. Menoken had 
condescendingly poked fun at the nativism and 
Prohibitionism that characterized American-style "majority 
rule." A contempt for democracy was fashionable among many 
American intellectuals, such as Irving Babbitt, who decried 
universal suffrage and suggested America might need its own 
Mussolini to save itself from the equivalent of a Lenin. 
Suggestions of this kind multiplied alarmingly among 
conservatives as the Depression intensified in 1932, and by 
1934 former president Hoover was writing an alarmed defense 
of old-fashioned American liberalism, which he saw assailed 
everywhere by the "regimentation" of Communism, Fascism, 
Nazism and the New Deal. (38) 
In the midst of postwar disillusionment and the 
Depression, many had decided that new, different types of 
governments --including Fascist dictatorships --might be 
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right for some nations. As Emil Ludwig noted in the 
Introduction to his Talks ~ Mussolini, one reason he had 
changed his opinion on Mussolini to a favorable one was the 
evidence that "the foundations of 'democracy' and 
'parliamentarism are crumbling." (39) 
Mussolini's Fascist state, despite its positive 
aspects, was nevertheless widely known as a dictatorship 
that suppressed vital freedoms and condoned political 
murder. Herbert Hoover observed in hindsight that Italian 
Fascism, while it "was attracting more public attention 
than Communism . it was equally a despotism with a 
police state wholly denying most freedoms." As Fascism was 
known to have many of the same repressive characteristics 
Americans criticized in Bolshevik Russia, it is worthwhile 
to ask why the American government and public's initial 
reaction to Mussolini was not more unfavorable. This 
question and its answer were summarized well by British 
political commentator Harold Laski in 1923: 
The historian of the next generation cannot 
fail to be impressed by the different reception 
accorded to the changes of which Lenin and 
Mussolini have been the chief authors. Where 
Lenin's system has won for itself international 
ostracism and armed intervention, that of 
Mussolini has been the subject of widespread 
enthusiasm. He himself has been decorated by 
the governments of foreign powers; ambassadors 
have exhausted the language of eulogy at 
official banquets; and great men of business 
have not hesitated to say that only the 
emulation of his methods can reduce the working 
classes to a proper state of mind. Yet, save 
in intensity, there has been no difference in 
the method pursued by the two men; and it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the 
different reception of their effort is the 
outcome of their antithetic attitudes to 
property. (40) 
Under Fascism, as Ambassador Child had noted, there 
was no abolition of capital or private enterprise, and 
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class war and state ownership were vigorously opposed. The 
Fascist corporate state, with its producers' and consumers' 
cooperatives organizing all industries and labor, did not 
pose a threat to capitalism. Child equated these 
organizations and their expert leadership councils with 
some of the measures instituted to create government-
business cooperation in the United States during World 
War I. This sort of "expert" leadership and business-
government cooperation held a certain appeal for Child and 
others who wanted to keep America on the track of 
prosperity. (41) 
Mussolini's propaganda efforts in America paid off 
admirably. In 1925, Italian and American representatives 
agreed to settle Italy's World War I debt on terms that 
favored Rome, and the British soon followed suit. The 
Morgan Bank lent Mussolini's government $100 million 
shortly afterward, and other American loans over the next 
two years totaled $140 million to help build Italy's 
infrastructure. (42) 
American investment in Italy increased over the course 
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of the decade, with direct investment in Italian utilities 
exceeding $66 million by 1930, and American loans reaching 
$462 million. Major American companies such as United 
States Steel, General Electric, Bankers Trust Company, and 
the Mellon interests hastened to Italy to take advantage of 
the opportunities Mussolini offered, and the improved 
relationship motivated Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover 
to suggest that "a man of large industrial, financial and 
commercial vision" be appointed to help protect these 
interests. ( 43) 
The friendly relationship between Italy and the United 
States continued well into the 1930s despite Italy's desire 
to "have its place in the sun." (44) It even weathered 
the assiduous efforts of the American "highbrow" press to 
publicize Mussolini's involvement with American Fascist 
organizations and the impressment of Italian-American U.S. 
citizens visiting Italy. (45) 
Mussolini disavowed the activities of Fascists abroad, 
particularly when they said or did anything offensive to 
the Americans. As the ostensible creator of Fascism and 
its doctrines, Ll ~ was in a position to decry 
activities as not being reflective of "true" Fascism, and 
he did this frequently. The Italian Ambassadors to the 
United States, Gelasia Caetani and his successor Giacomo de 
Martino, were often the mouthpieces for these assertions. 
Mussolini had not purged the government of all its 
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former functionaries, and Caetani and de Martino 
represented a class of career diplomats who "had agreed to 
serve Mussolini in the hope of curbing Fascism's inflated 
·ambit ions abroad . . . . " Before the Musso lin i-Hearst 
alliance took hold, Caetani had seen the early unflattering 
portrayal of Italian-American Fascist groups (fasci) in the 
Hearst press, where they were presented as "haunts of 
criminal and subversive elements." He wanted to curb their 
activities to prevent further discrimination against 
Italian immigrants and possible problems in funding Italy's 
war debt to the United States. However, these efforts were 
opposed from within by Fascist party enthusiasts in Italy 
and America, leading to "smoldering hostility between a 
cautious bureaucratic class and the exuberant party 
zealots . (46) 
The balance tipped in favor of the zealots in 1925, 
when Mussolini imposed full dictatorship and settled the 
war debt with the United States. There was no longer as 
much reason to fear America's reaction to Fascist 
agitation within its borders. Count Ignazio Thaon di 
Revel came to America to unite the different fasci into 
the Fascist League, and openly admitted he was an 
authorized representative of the Italian government. 
In the early years of Fascism, Washington had had some 
misgivings about the Fascist organizations, but de Martino, 
the second of the ambassadors, received little support for 
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his offers to curb their activities. In the Departments of 
State, Justice and Labor, the sporadic violence of these 
groups was excused because of their apparent anti-
Bolshevism and support for law and order. (47) 
In 1927, when discussions arose over the activities of 
Fascist organizations within the United States, de Martino 
insisted that "Mr. Hussolini was very angry at many of the 
things that were happening and said that many of the 
Fascists were acting as fools" by marching in uniform and 
performing other activities he insisted were beyond the 
control and "absolutely contrary to the advice of the 
[Italian] Government." However, the evidence clearly 
shows that Hussolini was behind the organization and 
maintenance of the American fascist groups from the 
beginning. ( 48) 
In February 1928, the American Embassy in Rome 
expressed concern over some new "commandments of the Duce" 
bearing Mussolini's signature and clearly expressing his 
desire to extend his rule as absolute law to Fascist 
organizations abroad, including those in the United States. 
De Martino moved quickly to explain that he had urged 
Mussolini "on account of special conditions in the United 
States, to make those orders not applicable in this 
country." He also noted that many of these Leagues were 
composed of "cranks" whose activities could give Italy a 
bad name by association, but since they were made up 
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largely of American citizens, they could not be controlled 
effectively from Rome. (49) 
The Secretary of State seconded this position in 
response to an inquiry from Representative Hamilton Fish, 
Jr. regarding American Fascist activities. (50) In 
November 1929, Marcus Duffield's article in Harper's, 
"Mussolini's American Empire," had accused the Fascist 
groups of harassing Italian-Americans and impeding their 
naturalization as American citizens. Although a State 
Department inquiry proved much of Duffield's evidence to be 
inaccurate (a fact he admitted), Mussolini disbanded the 
Fascist League in the United States. To soften the blow, 
the Secretary of State issued a statement to the press 
noting that his department's investigation had revealed no 
activities against the United States government on the part 
of Italian officials or American residents of Italian 
extraction. The Secretary's statement continued: 
So far as the dissolution of the Fascist 
League is concerned, inasmuch as the existence 
and purpose of that League have been the 
subject of adverse speculative comment and 
possible misunderstanding, I am glad to 
express my appreciation that the League has 
dissolved itself in the interest of removing 
those misunderstandings and better relations 
between this country and Italy. (51) 
This incident demonstrates Mussolini's efforts to stay in 
good favor with the American government and public. 
Admittedly, the efforts of Mussolini's diplomats to control 
his overreaching kept this incident from growing into 
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something far more troublesome. However, this was also due 
to the American government's efforts to conciliate 
Mussolini, even when questions arose of his possible 
meddling with the lives of Italian immigrants on American 
soil. 
Throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s, Mussolini 
insisted that Fascism was not a product for export, 
although this was only said to reassure foreigners. In 
reality, the Fascist government spent an enormous amount on 
propaganda, arms smuggling, and organizations abroad. (52) 
When asked by Emil Ludwig in 1932 whether Fascism could be 
exported to Germany, Mussolini answered that it was a 
purely Italian creation, although some of its ideas could 
be adapted to German conditions. (53) When the Nazis 
became prominent in German politics in the early thirties, 
the Italians made a concerted effort to dissociate 
themselves from the Hitler movement's objectionable 
activities. Mussolini was greatly helped in his efforts by 
Dine Grandi, his Foreign Minister from 1929 to 1932. 
Grandi was a dedicated Fascist whose "energy, charm, and 
persistence" served to conciliate the United States as well 
as Great Britain, where he went as Ambassador in 1932 after 
Mussolini forced him out and decided to serve as his own 
Foreign Minister. He visited the United States in 1931 and 
had a cordial visit with Undersecretary of State Castle, 
who noted how "sensibly" he discussed European affairs. 
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Grandi applauded American efforts to take the lead in 
matters such as the international debt crisis. He also 
"took occasion to say that it annoyed the regime in Italy 
to have the Hitlerites call themselves fascists as they had 
nothing in common with fascism." (54) 
At the end of Grandi's visit, he and Secretary of 
State Stimson issued a joint statement emphasizing "the 
restoration of economic stability" and lauding Grandi's 
proposal for a one-year armaments truce, all at a time when 
Hitler's Nazis were making themselves a watchword for 
destructiveness and destabilization in Germany. The 
contrast could not have been more pronounced, and the words 
of Secretary Stimson in his memoirs bear repeating --in 
1931 and 1932, the Italians appeared to be "the least 
difficult" of the Continental powers. (55) 
Mussolini's dependability continued through 1934, when 
Hitler made his first attempt at annexing Austria by 
attacking the government of Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss. 
Mussolini intervened to prevent this attempted Nazi 
aggression, and as an apparent peacekeeper his popularity 
in Europe and the United States reached an all-time peak. 
He scored points again with American diplomats, one of whom 
observed: 
despite Mussolini's sympathy for Fascism 
in the Reich, the Duce is a hard-boiled realist 
and must of necessity exert every possible 
effort to prevent Germany's extending its 
frontier southward to the Brenner Pass. 
Germany today is not unlike a crazy man 
wildly brandishing a revolver. (56) 
Again, Mussolini disavowed Hitler and the more 
repellent features his regime displayed now that he had 
attained power: 
M. de Chambrun [the French Ambassador to 
Austria] said that Mussolini told him that 
Hitler was a disciple of Fascism who did not 
play the game according to the rules, meaning 
that Mussolini disapproves of persecutions of 
Jews and other features of the Nazi program. 
The French Ambassador also quoted Mussolini 
as saying that Hitler has less real power than 
is generally supposed and that there are some 
movements in Germany which he cannot 
control. (57) 
This last statement of Mussolini's, of course, would 
prove over time to be incorrect. Hitler consolidated his 
power with an alarming swiftness, and in fact had largely 
silenced all other parties by August 1933, when Mussolini 
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made this statement. Hitler took control of German society 
in a way Mussolini had never been able to do in Italy, 
where the church and the monarchy still held considerable 
power, and political opponents had kept him from 
solidifying his control until after the murder of Matteotti 
in 1924. Mussolini was the architect of Fascism, the man 
who had defined the movement and set down its doctrines, 
though he did so largely after its actual creation. (58) 
In 1933 he was still the senior member of what one American 
diplomat called the "community of interest between the two 
now Fascist nations." (59) 
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Hitler's expansionistic tendencies were averted in 
1934 but would later triumph throughout Europe, and 
Mussolini soon found himself forced into the role of junior 
·partner in an alliance with Hitler. (60) By 1936, 
Mussolini, who had previously stressed the differences 
between Nazism and Fascism, began to describe the two 
ideologies as German and Italian variants of the same 
program. He also began to consider Hitler's offer of an 
!tala-German alliance against Bolshevik Russia and the 
West. (61) Mussolini did act as a dictator within his own 
borders, but until the time of the Ethiopian invasion and 
his later alliance with Hitler, he was willing to carry out 
foreign policy within the confines of the international 
system, making him an acceptable ally to the Americans and 
other European nations. 
Hitler, however, had taken elements of Fascism and 
submerged them into a new "outlaw" ideology that not only 
disrespected the rights of its citizens but flouted the 
rules governing international conduct. Even before 
attaining power, Hitler had made his views clear, and he 
did not change after taking over Germany. His seeming 
disregard for international opinion and financial stability 
often caused American and British diplomats in Germany to 
view Nazism not as a more extreme variant of Italian 
Fascism, but as an ideology more akin to the "outlaw" 
regime of the time --Soviet Russia. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE AMERICANS AND WEIMAR GERMANY - THE 1920'S 
During the interwar period, American business and 
financial interests became truly multinational, extending 
themselves throughout Europe but most of all in Germany. 
The postwar American dominance in Europe required peace and 
prosperity in all European nations, but most of all it 
depended upon the stability of a new and precarious 
political entity -- the Weimar Republic. (1) 
The Weimar Republic began as a "makeshift democracy," 
improvised as an "emergency solution" to the problems of 
defeat in World War I. No long-standing tradition of 
republican government existed in Germany, although at the 
end of the war Reicbstag leaders were working to strengthen 
the democratic element under the empire. The republic had 
been created largely to appease the World War I victor 
nations and particularly Woodrow Wilson, who demanded an 
end to the monarchy. Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and 
General Erich Ludendorff, who had run the government as a 
da facto military dictatorship in the last years of the 
war, stepped aside and thus avoided for the loss of the 
war. The stigma of the loss was transferred to the new 
republic. When the victorious Allies imposed a harsh peace 
despite the Kaiser's abdication, the origins and aims of 
the republic seemed even more tainted. The result was a 
complicated political structure that was shaky from the 
beginning. (2) 
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The Weimar system had a proportionally elected 
legislature, the Reichstag, which gave each party a 
representative for every 60,000 votes received. While this 
configuration gave equal weight to each vote, it left the 
electorate "with the task of voting not persons but rather 
parties into power." (3) And Weimar Germany had political 
parties in profusion, representing every imaginable point 
on the political spectrum. These parties ranged from the 
Communists (KPD), the most radical of the leftist parties, 
to the leftist/liberal Social Democrats (SPD), to the 
liberal German Democratic Party, the Catholic Centre and 
the Bavarian People's Party to the far right parties -- the 
Nationalist Party (DNVP) led by publishing magnate Alfred 
Hugenberg, and eventually the National Socialist German 
Workers' Party (NSDAP), better known as the Nazis. Along 
with these major parties, there were numerous other 
splinter parties built around all manner of constituencies. 
Since no party could achieve a simple majority, the worst 
problem of the Reichstag was the inability of the major 
parties to form and sustain coalitions, particularly in the 
last chaotic years of the Republic. (4) 
German party politicians were more committed to their 
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own partisan ends than to the success of the republic 
itself, and many lacked an interest in the compromises 
required to make the government work. Sizable contingents 
of extremists in the Reichstag, on both the left and the 
right, did not want the system to work. These extremists 
included the Hugenberg Nationalists, the Communists, and in 
later years the Nazis. They were anything but a loyal 
opposition, and they worked constantly to destroy 
parliamentary democracy or disrupt its workings. Even the 
parties that wanted to maintain the Republic did not have 
real experience within a parliamentary framework. The 
heated interparty squabbling of Weimar politics was a 
legacy from the imperial past, in which the parties had 
been excluded from power and therefore had not been obliged 
to compromise and create viable governments. One of the 
most notable offenders in this was the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD), the largest party in the Reichstag throughout 
most of the Republic's existence. The Social Democrats 
shrank from compromises for fear of taking responsibility 
for any possible failures or unpopular actions. Without 
the cooperation of the largest party, the parliamentary 
system was in danger from the start. (5) 
There were other problematic aspects of the Weimar 
Constitution. The Constitution provided for the popular 
election of a Reichspresident to represent Germany abroad, 
appoint the Chancellor as head of government, and be 
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commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He also had the 
power to dissolve the Reichsta~ and to enact law by decree 
under Article 48 of the Constitution, though these 
emergency decrees required the approval of the Reichstag. 
(6) The use of the Article 48 emergency powers became most 
important in the last months in power of Chancellor 
Heinrich Br~ning. Faced with a hopelessly fragmented 
Reichstag, he carried the country through 1931 and 1932 
using the emergency decree powers, thus paving the way for 
their later use by the Nazis when Hitler took over as 
Chancellor in 1933. 
In the early 1920s, however, the worst dangers of 
Weimar democracy had not yet surfaced. Moreover, Germany's 
move to a republican form of government had helped change 
the American attitude toward the nation. The Germans, 
formerly cast as villains in a deluge of World War I 
propaganda, were now represented as decent, hardworking 
people who had been led into evil by their leaders, Kaiser 
Wilhelm II, Hindenburg and Ludendorff. In his 1920 message 
to Congress, President Wilson declared that the Germans had 
learned their lesson: 
You will remember that the beginning of the 
end of the war came when the German people 
found themselves face to face with the 
conscience of the world and realized that 
right was everywhere arrayed against the wrong 
that their government was attempting to 
perpetrate. (7) 
In the struggle to protect the republic against its 
enemies of both political extremes, the Americans 
understood their position, which was that of stabilizing 
the existing regime with economic relief. The American 
Commissioner warned in 1920 that there would be extreme 
disapproval of any attempt 
from whatever side to interfere with orderly 
and stable conditions. Acts of violence and 
endeavors to revolutionize the Government by 
unconstitutional methods will not fail to 
imperil the reestablishment of good relations 
with the United States. Such actions will also 
seriously interfere with the readjustment of 
Germany and the amelioration of the present 
unfavorable economic conditions by the measures 
of relief which have been projected and 
already initiated. (8) 
The Americans were aware that by controlling the flow 
of money and necessary goods to Germany, they held 
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considerable power over the republic's present and future. 
The financial element was the key to the maintenance of 
German democracy. In the words of Owen D. Young, Chairman 
of the Board of General Electric and later chairman of the 
committee that created the Young Plan for reparations 
revision, "you can not make progress toward high ideals 
until you get your money matters straightened out first." 
(9) Yet as the United States poured money into Germany, 
American business and bankers became ever more dependent 
upon the return of the monies invested, and thus more 
vulnerable should the republic fail or be endangered. 
The instability of the republic led to fears of 
possible debt repudiation by the Germans. The Americans 
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and British had already taken heavy losses because of the 
repudiation following the Russian Revolution, and these 
fears surfaced in the creation of the treaty of friendship 
between the United States and Germany in December 1923, 
which came on the heels of the notorious German inflation 
of that year. The Americans demanded and got a provision 
that the property of their nationals "not be taken without 
due process of law and without the payment of just 
compensation." There had been some discussion with the 
Germans over this provision, since the Weimar Constitution 
permitted the taking of property without compensation. In 
this case, however, given the fears and demands of the 
Americans, an exception was made. (10) 
As the leading creditor in the world, the United 
States was able to dictate policy to some extent. The U.S. 
was at the center of the reparations cycle in which Germany 
paid to compensate the Western Allies for the costs of 
World War I. This money was channeled by the Allies to the 
United States to pay back war debts to the Americans. The 
American banks completed the circularity by lending money 
to the Germans to help strengthen their economic base. 
Official American policy "admitted no direct connection 
between war debts and reparations" until the entire syste~ 
began to fall apart in the early 1930s, but the United 
States always had a vital role in keeping the cycle moving, 
and in keeping Weimar Germany solvent. (11) 
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When the German economy began to crumble in 1922, at 
least partly because of the reparations burden, the 
solution was apparent, given the financial position of the 
United States among the major nations: 
A new, less stringent agreement tied to an 
American loan to Germany was needed but this 
depended on the debt settlement: Britain owed 
the United States; France and the other allies 
owed Britain; and Germany owed France and the 
Allies." (12) 
An agreement was finally hammered out with the help of 
Stanley Baldwin, then British Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
France occupied the Ruhr in 1923 in retaliation for German 
nonpayment of reparations, and this spurred on the 
negotiations. In April 1924, a plan was created by an 
international committee headed by American financier 
Charles Dawes, a "new reparations scheme to take the 
pressure off Germany." President Coolidge praised the 
Dawes Plan, insisting that reparation adjustment was "not a 
political but a business problem," though State Department 
Financial Advisor Herbert Feis was perhaps more accurate in 
later years when he described the war debts as "sludge left 
after the fires of the First World War had died down." 
(13) The Dawes Plan did take the pressure off a while, but 
in 1929 the Americans were forced to step in with another 
plan for loans and revisions of reparations --the Young 
Plan, named for Owen D. Young of General Electric, who 
chaired the international committee that created the plan. 
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The Young Plan was highly controversial in Germany, and the 
Nazis, Nationalists and Communists gained considerable 
publicity and numerous adherents by opposing it. 
Many have insisted that the Weimar leaders were 
themselves responsible for their nation's financial 
problems, and some have even accused them of engineering 
the disastrous inflation of 1923, but these leaders still 
represented the kind of stable republican government the 
United States wanted to see in Germany. In keeping with 
American policy of the times, Weimar was stabilized not 
through political means but with American money. Between 
1924 and 1929, American banks made major loans to German 
governments at all levels, from local to national. 
American money also rebuilt many sectors of German 
industry, and the American public bought nearly $1.5 
billion in German stocks and bonds. Reparations were 
received as planned, but only because of the enormous 
influx of foreign, and particularly American, funds. 
Between 1924 and 1929, Germany borrowed approximately 13.5 
thousand million reichsmarks, while her reparation 
obligations were only 8.5 thousand million reicbsmarks. 
(14) In 1925 and 1926, the American Embassy in Berlin and 
S. Parker Gilbert, the American Agent General for 
Reparations, began to express open alarm regarding the 
extent of American loans and investments in Germany, an 
alarm that would later be echoed in other quarters. (15) 
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However, American investment in Germany continued largely 
unabated until the Depression struck both nations. 
What the Americans feared most was the resurgence of 
any kind of extremist politics that could threaten the 
investment climate. Some of their worst fears would 
subsequently be justified in the late 1920s and early 1930s 
by the Nazi, Communist and Nationalist activity against the 
Young Plan. 
Weimar Germany was rife with political and financial 
crises, including the abortive right-wing Kapp Putsc~ of 
1920, the French occupation of the Ruhr, and the subsequent 
hyperinflation of 1922-23. Despite the constant problems 
and disorder, many Americans held an image of the Germans 
as an orderly, peaceful people who only needed a chance to 
reorder their nation and put representative government to 
work. John Foster Dulles, even while observing the unrest 
of the Kapp E~tsQn and the Communist revolt in the Ruhr in 
1920, marveled at the essential German orderliness and 
respect for property. As Edgar Ansel Mowrer observed in 
1928 of the "revolution" that created the Republic, 
It was essentially the act of a people that 
instinctively and by education prefers 
"quiet and order" to political freedom and the 
right to play the piano after ten P.M .. 
It was a German revolution, a respectable, 
orderly, self-controlled, decent, middle-class 
revolution. (16) 
American support for the Weimar Republic was strongly 
colored by the perception that a parliamentary, republican 
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form of government should be able to succeed in Germany. 
Jacob Gould Schurman, the American Ambassador to Germany, 
made an optimistic declaration in 1927 that the two nations 
were both true democracies: 
Never in our history have the political 
institutions and international ideas of Germany 
and the United States been so much in agreement 
as they are today. Both nations believe in 
government of the people, by the people, and for 
the people. Both are instinctively and 
unalterably opposed to dictators, no matter 
whether the dictator is an individual or 
a class. (17) 
Schurman's views were echoed by others, such as Oswald 
Garrison Villard, the liberal editor of the Nation. He 
observed in early 1933, just before Hitler took over as 
Chancellor, that the Germans "are naturally friendly to 
America and far more like ourselves than any other European 
peoples, excepting the English." Assuming this to be true, 
Villard could not believe that they would entirely reject 
republican government: 
That the Republic, for the moment, is but a 
shadow of what it was intended to be is 
undeniable. Yet it is difficult to believe 
that Germany with its traditions and its 
heritage will long remain at the mercy either 
of dictators or demagogues. (18) 
During the Weimar years, Americans sometimes appeared 
to be looking for similarities between the German and 
American political traditions, or at least for evidence 
that the Germans were ready for self-government. As 
Villard noted, 
.in various ways the Germans were not 
wholly ready for the democracy which in 
considerable degree Mr. Wilson and the Allies 
forced upon them . . . . It must be pointed 
out here, however, that if no nation could, 
or should, assume the burdens and accept the 
penalties of a republican form of government 
until it is in every way ideally prepared for 
them, the world would to-day still be in the 
grip of absolute monarchies. (19) 
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This attitude, of course, was quite different from the 
one that had prevailed during World War I and would be seen 
again in the anti-German propaganda of World War II. As 
Hitler's atrocities became more apparent over the course of 
the 1930s, American observers returned to the World War I 
view that the Germans were incapable of understanding 
anything but brute force and power. (20) 
In the Weimar years, however, some Americans asserted 
that the Germans should be able to hold a republic 
together. They were, as Villard had pointed out, far more 
like the Americans and the British than were, for example, 
the Italians, who had adapted so well to a Fascist 
dictatorship. In order to hold onto this view about German 
democracy, Americans were forced to ignore many of the 
facts about Germany's unreadiness for self-government and 
its inability to maintain order within its own borders. 
British diplomats retained a less sanguine attitude 
than the Americans about German capabilities for self-
government. The British were also somewhat upset by the 
resurgence of pro-German feeling in America. Their charge' 
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d'affaires in Washington reported with alarm on the 
American popularity of John Maynard Keynes' 1920 book, Iha 
Economic Conseguences Q[ ~ Peace, which urged the allies 
not to bleed Germany dry. To the British diplomat, 
America's sudden new concern for Germany's welfare was 
motivated by "both the idealism and the business-like 
instincts of the American people." The British also 
expressed frequent doubt about the German republic in view 
of Germany's militaristic past, passion for hierarchy, and 
"national character." (21) 
They perhaps remembered their history better than the 
Americans did. Lord Kilmarnock, the British Ambassador in 
Berlin, spoke gloomily of the Germans in 1920, when the 
republic had barely begun: 
Trained as they have been for a century in the 
tradition of obedience, with a peasantry 
conservative in instinct, and the majority of 
their so-called socialists disciplined to a 
docile acceptance of the orders of those they 
have placed in power, it is by no means 
improbable that a strong Government may be 
established, which, even though democratic 
in form, will be autocratic in 
essentials . . . . (22) 
To Kilmarnock, the German character was highly suspect: 
It is extremely difficult for a foreigner 
to understand the complex psychology of the 
German, whose nature is a combination of 
genuine kind-heartedness and of latent 
brutality. His character is not the less 
complex now, in the moment of his 
defeat. (23) 
To the British, the Germans lacked the capacity for self-
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government, as was sadly demonstrated by their multiplicity 
of warring parties and factions: 
This bewildering mass of parties which seems 
to be tending towards guQi homines. ~ 
sententiae may be partly due to the absence of 
responsible political life in the past history 
of Germany. It certainly testifies to the 
incapacity of the Germans for compromise which 
to my mind is due to their complete lack of a 
sense of humour, a conception for which no 
equivalent exists in the German language. It 
is also possible that the German character has 
remained substantially the same since the days 
of Tacitus and that particularism and 
federalism now take the place of inter-tribal 
warfare and that the political entity now 
affects the wilderness which the primitive 
household wished to place between itself and 
its nearest neighbours. (24) 
The maintenance of order was indeed a constant problem 
in the early years of the republic, and would prove even 
more difficult in the early 1930s as parliamentary 
government disintegrated. The United States was committed 
to maintaining the republic, but was often thwarted by 
France's nationalistic demands for security, reparations, 
and German territory. In 1920, when the French occupied 
Frankfurt, Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby noted that 
this action could endanger the republic by bringing 
together destabilizing elements from both the militarist 
right and the radical left. He registered his protests as 
follows: 
The Government of the United States can only 
reiterate its already expressed opinion that 
occupation of more territory in Germany 
promises to cause a junction of militaristic 
forces in Germany and elements of German 
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people striving for revolution and the 
overturn of political and economic order. (25) 
Only a month before Colby wrote these words, Germany 
had experienced this very problem. Militarism had sprung 
forth in the form of the abortive Kapp Putsch, and various 
unsuccessful left-wing revolts broke out around Germany at 
the same time. The Secretary of State had summarized the 
two greatest threats to the unpopular fledgling republic 
the militaristic right and the communist left. The 
Americans threw their weight behind "the efforts of the 
German government in its conflict with both the forces of 
reaction and militarism and of anarchy." And "anarchy," in 
the diplomatic documents of the time, was associated almost 
exclusively with Bolshevism and similar leftist 
revolutionary movements. At the time of the Kapp Putsch 
and the leftist revolts, Ellis Loring Dresel, the 
Commissioner at Berlin, spoke of "lawlessness and anarchy," 
and saw the Weimar government as "the only agency capable 
of preventing a state of utter chaos." He received a 
response from Washington expressing the same fears in even 
stronger language, noting the government's "conflict with 
both the forces of reaction and militarism and of anarchy" 
and the necessity of "preserving democracy and . . up-
holding law and order against those sinister and anti-
democratic elements which would plunge Germany into a state 
of lawlessness and anarchy." (26) 
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American fears of German militarism had a long history 
and were well justified. Nevertheless, Communism was the 
threat that held the most weight with both the Americans 
and the British, and the German leaders were aware of this 
fact. They knew the value of the "bogey of Bolshevism" and 
invoked it often when dealing with the Anglo-American 
diplomats. The threat had been used at Versailles to get 
more lenient treatment in the armistice, and would reappear 
throughout the life of the Republic. (27) 
During the abortive right-wing Kapp Putsch, which came 
at the time of America's postwar Red Scare, Weimar leaders 
were already showing an astute sense of how to get 
attention. To draw attention to their own plight and to 
ensure their own perpetuation in power, they turned again 
to the possibility of a Bolshevist triumph: 
Bauer, Chancellor, and Schiffer, Minister of 
Justice, in a talk with a reliable American 
correspondent, stated that the political 
situation was very precarious. They stated 
that the most promising means of saving Germany 
and all Central Europe from Bolshevism would be 
a strong statement by the American President 
whose word would carry great weight if he 
declared that no raw materials or foodstuffs 
could be furnished a Germany adopting an 
ultraradical form of government. (28) 
The disastrous inflation of 1922-23 also brought 
widespread economic discontent and seemed the perfect 
breeding ground for Bolshevism. One consular officer in 
Munich observed later that during this period, 
The chaotic condition of society was such that 
there was genuine reason to fear that 
Bolshevism might take the same advantage of 
confusion in Germany and Austria which it had 
taken in Russia after the collapse of the 
Czarist empire. (29) 
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In November 1922, the American Ambassador to Germany, 
Alanson B. Houghton, sounded a similar refrain when 
discussing the grave situation of the poor in Europe and 
particularly in Germany: "There is no future to beckon 
them on, unless it be the mirage of Bolshevism." Houghton, 
an old-fashioned Ivy League American diplomat, who had seen 
the tragedies inflicted by Bolshevism in eastern Europe, 
went on to describe the possibility of the European 
republics falling like dominoes: 
Already the Bolshevist tide is beating against 
the barriers of European civilization. And if 
once those barriers go down, if the German 
people, in despair, believing that sympathy and 
help and understanding of their position are 
denied them, turn for relief to the East, the 
time is past. That tide will sweep resistlessly 
to the Atlantic. (30) 
To an old-line diplomat and American Brahmin such as 
Houghton, America had a mission: "God has been good to us 
in America. He has made it possible for us to create and 
pile up huge wealth." That wealth, in his view, had to be 
used to shore up the forces of order in Germany: "When one 
sees the forces of civilization in the balance, one must be 
lacking in moral courage to withhold any suggestion that 
points to safety (31) Many of the same fears of 
Bolshevism and disorder haunted America's British partners 
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in status quo diplomacy. Colonel McGrath of the British 
War Office observed in 1923 that Germany was "on the brink 
of economic collapse" and that "this form of collapse is 
the best breeding ground for Communist germs (32) 
Fears of Communism in Germany were further encouraged 
by Gustav Stresemann, who served as German Chancellor for a 
short period in 1923 and as Foreign Minister from 1923 
until his death in 1929. Stresemann was a highly respected 
diplomat, admired by both Lord D'Abernon, the British 
ambassador to Germany from 1920-26, and Sir Horace Rumbold, 
his successor. (33) He was also a "pragmatic 
conservative" who would have preferred a constitutional 
monarchy for Germany but supported the republic as a lesser 
evil than the only visible alternatives -- a dictatorship 
of the right or the left. (34) 
Stresemann's aims included freeing Germany from 
foreign occupation, solving the reparations problem in a 
way acceptable to Germany, protecting German nationals 
abroad, recovering Danzig and the Polish corridor, and 
adjusting the frontier of Upper Silesia. (35) His 
insistence on the use of finesse, not force, to achieve 
German objectives, alienated him from the German 
Nationalists, the Nazis, and the paramilitary and 
Reichswehr (army) groups -- this despite his covert 
assistance to the Reichswehr's efforts to rearm secretly in 
violation of the Versailles treaty's restrictions. (36) 
Western fears of Bolshevism and American financial 
interests in Germany stood at the center of Stresemann's 
revisionist strategy: 
As early as 1920 his political analysis had 
defined the four cardinal points around which 
he would build his future policy: (1) direct 
negotiations with France, (2) the balancing 
potential of England, (3) the vital interests 
of the United States in a stable and high-
consumption market in Europe, and (4) the 
Western powers' antipathy and sense of anxiety 
regarding Bolshevist Russia. From these 
points, Stresemann conceived the necessity of 
a foreign policy aimed at the simultaneous 
"recognition (as a consequence of the 
lost war) and revision (as the desirable aim 
of any national German foreign policy) of the 
Treaty of Versailles." 
Within the framework of this policy of 
simultaneous recognition and revision, 
Stresemann pursued a balance between East and 
West, believing that Germany's long-range 
opportunities lay in the tensions between 
Soviet Russia and the capitalist powers. (37) 
Stresemann's chief objectives in foreign policy 
centered on the revision of the Versailles Treaty, a 
lasting source of German bitterness because of its 
96 
accusation of war guilt and demands for German reparations 
and disarmament. He played on British and French fears of 
the Soviet Union, insisting that an economically and 
militarily strong Germany was the only bulwark against a 
Soviet takeover of Europe. Thus he saw the German 
Communist riots of the 1920s as a "splendid opportunity" 
for the creation of foreign policy, since they illustrated 
his view that an impoverished, disarmed Germany would be 
easy prey for the Communists. Throughout the 1920s, he 
punctuated his discourse with constant warnings of a 
"bolshevik flood" which could take over all Europe if 
Germany were not restored to its former strength. (38) 
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As we have seen, the two major threats to Weimar 
democracy in the early 1920s were the resurgence of 
militarism and the emergence of Bolshevism. The early 
Nazis played a relatively minor role in the thinking of 
American and British diplomats. At this time Nazis were 
merely one of many right-wing splinter parties based in 
Bavaria. The first American government report on Hitler 
and the Nazis was written in 1922. Despite the chiefly 
regional emphasis of the early Nazis, Ambassador Alanson B. 
Houghton sent his observer, Captain Truman Smith of the 
military attache' office, to interview Hitler in November 
1922, one year before the Beer Hall Putsch. This was 
largely an afterthought on Houghton's part, as the main 
subjects to be interviewed in Munich were Prince Ruprecht, 
pretender to the Bavarian throne, and Erich von Ludendorff, 
the World War I military hero, whose political ambitions 
Houghton wanted to determine. (39) 
Ludendorff had by this time become a Nazi supporter, 
and he lectured Smith on the ineffectiveness of the Weimar 
Republic and the need to stamp out Bolshevism in Germany. 
Only a strong nationalist government, he insisted, could 
preserve Germany from chaos and ensure further payment of 
reparations. Hitler himself depicted his group primarily 
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as an anti-Marxist movement. He insisted that only a 
dictatorship could properly govern Germany, and that 
parliamentarism must be ended. He, like Ludendorff, played 
to American interests by insisting that reparations must be 
paid, though at a reduced rate, for Germany to regain its 
reputation. He insisted it was better for America and 
Britain that the struggle against Bolshevism be fought on 
German soil. 
Smith reported Hitler's statements as follows: 
If we (America) do not help German nationalism, 
bolshevism will conquer Germany. Then there 
will be no more reparations, and Russia and 
German bolshevism, out of motives of self-
preservation, must attack the Western nations. 
He called Hitler "a marvelous demagogue." (40) His 
group, Smith concluded, was more a popular movement than a 
political party, and "must be considered as the Bavarian 
counterpart to the Italian Fascisti" who had just completed 
their March on Rome a year earlier. At this point, Hitler 
was emphasizing some of the same policies as Mussolini, 
including anti-Bolshevism, reconciliation with foreign 
powers (such as France), and financial solvency through the 
repayment of reparations. Smith noted, however, that in 
his conversation Hitler omitted one of the chief planks of 
his party's propaganda, and one of his characteristic 
differences from Mussolini -- his notorious anti-Semitism. 
(39) 
In a draft magazine article from 1924, Smith noted the 
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Nazi leaders' claim to be "the Fascisti of Teutonic Europe, 
yearning to give their country the benefits of a Mussolini 
statesmanship . " but concluded that their resemblance 
was limited mostly to the outward trappings of Fascism: 
"The Mussolini genius, however, with that theatricalism so 
correctly pitched to the Italian temperament, has escaped 
them." He dismissed the Nazis as a "crude Teutonic 
imitation, with anti-Semitism substituting for the absent 
"essence" of Italian Fascism. However, he disputed those 
who scoffed at Hitler's chances for power, and insisted he 
could pose a danger if economic prosperity did not return 
to Germany. (42) British observers of the same time noted 
many of the same tendencies as Smith did, including Nazi 
violence and anti-semitism, and referred to Hitler as "the 
Bavarian Musso 1 in i." ( 43) 
Thus, it is apparent that early British and American 
observers of Hitler (most of whom were military men, not 
diplomats) saw his movement as an imitation or variant of 
Mussolini's Italian Fascism, which in some ways it was. 
This is a notable contrast to the views of the diplomatic 
observers of the early 1930s, who, for reasons to be 
discussed later, often tended to see the Nazis as something 
more akin to Bolsheviks than Italian Fascists. In the 
early 1920s Hitler was interpreted, with considerable 
justification, as a cheap and relatively minor German 
imitator of Mussolini. 
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The changes in Hitler and the Nazi party over the 
course of the decade made the early Nazis fundamentally 
different from the party that would confront diplomatic 
observers in the early 1930s. The failed Beer Hall Putsch 
of 1923 and Hitler's subsequent jail term, during which he 
wrote ~Kampf, modified the party in significant ways. 
Hitler abandoned the idea of a "March on Berlin" modeled on 
Mussolini's experience, and instead worked toward taking 
power by legal methods, achieving mass mobilization, 
bringing in new members from a larger geographical area, 
and creating a system of total obedience to himself as the 
Fuhrer. ( 44) 
After a mockery of a trial that largely served to gain 
Hitler nationwide publicity, he was sentenced to the 
minimum term of five years in prison for his part in the 
Beer Hall Putsch. The Nazis were one of many right-wing 
splinter groups in Bavaria, and were pampered and financed 
by leading Nationalists and conservatives. (45) Hitler's 
stay in prison was comfortable and considerably shorter 
than his actual sentence. In prison he found time to write 
~ Kampf, the ostensible intellectual foundation of 
Nazism. As historian Alan Bullock has noted, 
Every one of the elements in his worldview is 
easily identified in nineteenth-century and 
turn-of-the-century writers, but no one had 
previously put them together in quite the same 
way. (46) 
Hitler claimed influences from Nietzsche, Ranke, 
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Treitschke, Marx, Bismarck, Lanz von Liebenfels and others, 
but his reading appears to have been mostly a search for a 
framework on which to hang his "vulgarised Darwinian 
ideas." (47) However, Hitler had little use for ideas 
throughout his career, since he understood that the method 
of propagating ideas was the real key to power. To him, 
policies, tactics, and platforms were always matters of 
mere expediency, and he kept his terms as vague as possible 
in order to keep from being committed to any particular 
course of action. In a favorite demagogic slogan, Nazi 
Gregor Strasser even described National Socialism as "the 
opposite of what exists today." (48) 
In the early years of the party, there is evidence 
that Hitler regarded himself less as a charismatic leader 
on the Mussolini model than as a "drum-major" creating 
support for nationalist goals. In the years before 
Hitler's prison term, the Nazis had worked closely with 
other right-wing nationalist groups and concentrated almost 
solely on taking power through a putsch (for example, the 
party did not compete in a single election before 1924). 
(49) 
The mid-1920s were not a good period for the Nazis, 
who were rarely a focus of interest by American and British 
diplomats during this period. The Bavarian government and 
most other major provincial governments in Germany had 
banned Hitler from making speeches between 1925 and 1928. 
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Given Hitler's extraordinary prowess as a speaker, the lack 
of compelling orators among the other Nazis, and Hitler's 
own views on the superiority of the spoken over the written 
word as a propaganda vehicle, this was a devastating attack 
on the Nazi party's major attraction. (50) 
Also, these years had brought relative prosperity, 
spurred by foreign capital, with the national income 
reaching prewar levels. Unemployment was minimal in 1927, 
and in an atmosphere of stability and prosperity Hitler's 
negative message gained few adherents. In 1928, the ban on 
Hitler's speaking was lifted, and the number of party 
members had risen to 60,000 from 17,000 in 1926. Still, 
the Nazis only gained 12 seats in the Reich elections of 
1928 -- less than half their stated goal, and barely enough 
to make them a notable splinter party. (51) 
The Nazis only reached national prominence as the 
Depression intensified, unemployment skyrocketed, and 
Hitler capitalized on the enormous publicity he got as a 
leader of the 1929 campaign against the Young Plan, which 
was financed from the deep pockets of publishing magnate 
and Nationalist leader Alfred Hugenberg. The Nazi party 
did not become the focus of major international attention 
again until its massive election victory of September 1930, 
but some of the earliest American impressions of the Nazis 
remained over time, even after the reality of the party had 
changed considerably. Up to the last days of the Weimar 
103 
Republic, American diplomats often persisted in seeing the 
Nazis as a divided party under several leaders (some of 
whom -- such as Gregor Strasser --seemed alarmingly 
communistic). Rarely was Hitler perceived as an absolute 
leader on the Mussolini model, largely because Mussolini 
was seen as a statesman and Hitler was still continually 
underestimated by observers of all nationalities. 
Interestingly, the fear surrounding Hitler was not so 
much that he might rule with an iron fist, but rather that 
he would not be able or willing to control the disparate 
elements of his party. As late as 1932, in his Talks ~ 
Mussolioi, German biographer Emil Ludwig dismissed the 
possibility of successfully exporting Fascism to his native 
Germany, insisting that "on the German stage there is no 
star performer competent to play the part of Fascist 
leader." (52) By this time Hitler was a major player in 
German politics, and by expressing such sentiments Ludwig 
was explicitly indicating that he could not develop into 
another leader of the caliber of Mussolini. 
In the early years of Hitler's political activity, 
American and British observers saw his party as a Fascist 
growth modeled after Mussolini's party, yet they refused to 
take him seriously as a leader. This made sense in view of 
the fact that he had as yet done little to warrant such 
attention. The most he could be, in their view, was a sort 
of third-rate, tinhorn, failed version of Mussolini. This 
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attitude changed markedly in the early 1930s as Hitler's 
party emerged as a real force in German politics. At that 
time, the American and British diplomats described the 
Nazis as resembling Bolsheviks and numerous other political 
groups, but rarely as resembling the Italian Fascists. 
This was due in part to some genuine differences in 
strategy, tactics, and ideology between the two Fascist 
leaders and their parties. Yet most of it all it was based 
on a profound admiration of Mussolini in both America and 
Britain, which lasted up to the time of the Italian 
invasion of Ethiopia. It was difficult for the Anglo-
American policy elite to see any real resemblance between 
Hitler, the man who was setting out to destroy economic 
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CHAPTER V 
THE AMERICAN DIPLOMATS AND THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC, 1930-33 
In September 1930, an extraordinary event transformed 
the course of German political history. Hitler's Nazis 
made astounding gains in the German elections, increasing 
their representation in the Reichstag from 12 to 107 
members. The German Communist Party (KPD) also made 
significant gains, and suddenly the focus of American 
leadership fell upon the critical situation in Germany, 
where dissatisfaction with the status quo had led to a 
situation of dangerous destabilization. Before examining 
the Anglo-American diplomats' reactions to the Nazi Party's 
milestone victory and ascent to power, it is necessary to 
describe some of the personalities and governmental factors 
affecting their policies and perceptions of German events 
in the early 1930s. 
The tone of America's politics and diplomacy in these 
years was set by the President, Herbert Hoover. A 
brilliant engineer, administrator, and economist, Hoover 
had been one of the outstanding figures of America's 
prosperous "New Era" of the twenties. After spearheading 
the postwar European food relief campaign, he led the 
Commerce Department through a period of extraordinary 
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expansion at home and abroad, leading one American official 
to refer to him as "Secretary of Commerce and Under-
Secretary of all other departments." (1) 
It was Hoover's misfortune to become President in the 
most difficult of times. He was elected in 1928, the stock 
market crash followed in October 1929, and the Great 
Depression intensified relentlessly throughout his single 
term in the White House. Hoover was a man of great virtues 
--brilliant, principled, and extremely hardworking, but he 
also had an unfortunate lack of charisma and several other 
traits that were problematic at a time when the nation 
needed a boost in its morale. He was notoriously taciturn 
and gloomy, and became more so as the economic situation 
worsened. His Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, noted 
his predilection for "seeing the dark side first," and Esme 
Howard, the British Ambassador, called him "without 
exception, the most difficult American to know whom I have 
ever met." (2) 
Hoover had extensive international experience, perhaps 
more than any previous president. Yet he remained 
"absorbed in a fog of gloom" while trying to solve the 
domestic problems of the Depression economy, and thus left 
most of the conduct of foreign policy in the hands of 
Secretary Stimson. (3) Hoover's attempts to solve the 
economy's problems were heavily reliant on voluntary 
cooperation between business and the White House, with 
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Congress in the role of spectator. Yet as the Depression 
worsened, so did the conflicts with Congress, the press, 
and the public, leaving the president in an ever more 
embattled position. (4) 
Hoover prized loyalty over experience in elective 
office among his cabinet members, who were generally 
business-oriented and somewhat apolitical. In Secretary 
Stimson, however, he found a man of admirable loyalty and 
experience despite their admitted differences of 
temperament. (5) Stimson has been called "the founding 
father and patron saint" of the American foreign policy 
establishment because of his fifty-year career near the 
center of power. As a diplomat, Secretary of State and 
Secretary of War, he served presidents of both parties and 
various personalities, ranging from Theodore Roosevelt to 
Harry Truman. As a protege of the old Progressive 
nationalists and a product of the highest reaches of the 
American aristocracy, he was well-suited to the task of 
helping the United States ascend to global power, a mission 
he believed in firmly though less vocally than other old 
nationalists of Theodore Roosevelt's generation. (6) 
Stimson was "the very paradigm of the American 
gentleman," a man of absolute personal and public rectitude 
who inspired great loyalty in his subordinates. (7) 
His impeccable background -- Phillips Andover Academy, Yale 
College, Skull and Bones, Harvard Law -- made him a fitting 
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leader for the very patrician Foreign Service of the era 
and for the emerging period of Anglo-American international 
cooperation. Men of Stimson's background saw themselves as 
"the equals of the British and the superiors of everyone 
else." He had spent much of his youth in Paris and London, 
and admitted to having strong sympathies for the British 
and French and a distrust of German militarism. (8) 
American Ambassadors to European nations in the 1920s 
and 1930s, as today, were appointed by the President with 
the Senate's advice and consent according to the "spoils 
system" dating back to Andrew Jackson. This has 
traditionally led to an uneven quality of American 
representation abroad, including the accession of a fair 
number of "political hacks and lame ducks as well as 
genuinely worthy statesmen." (9) 
However, the spoils system also has offered certain 
advantages -- the prestige of some big-name ambassadors, 
their access to the higher corridors of power, and their 
ability to pay their own expenses (an important point, as 
American diplomacy has traditionally been an underfunded 
profession). As amateurs, however, American ambassadors 
were subject to accusations, sometimes justified, of 
excesses of sympathy or antipathy toward foreign leaders 
and regimes. Their advice to the State Department was 
often discounted, and their access to the President 
sometimes caused antagonism within the diplomatic 
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bureaucracy. (10) 
President Hoover was no exception in practicing the 
spoils system, leading to some degree of disgust among old-
line professional diplomats. Hoover had already made 
himself "hated in the State Department" during his days as 
Secretary of Commerce for keeping tight departmental 
control over American commercial attaches abroad and for 
siding with the President against the State Department. 
(11) The resentment of professional diplomats was 
expressed well by Lewis Einstein, a "career man" who served 
as minister to Czechoslovakia from 1921 to 1930. Einstein 
was a member of a prominent New York Republican family and 
a prime example of the cultured old-style career diplomat. 
President Hoover abruptly accepted his untendered 
resignation in 1930, removing him from his post. His 
observations many years later still rankled with the 
rivalry between the career men and the less diplomatically 
experienced political appointees: 
The ease with which he [Hoover] dropped many 
career men was not calculated to flatter 
their self-esteem, though doubtless it 
provided some lessons in humility. The 
presidential purpose was only one of utilizing 
diplomatic posts as a hidden subsidy for 
administration politics. My successor in 
Prague obtained his training for world affairs 
by running a taxi company. (12) 
Frederic Sackett, Hoover's choice for Ambassador to 
Germany, fit the "lame-duck political appointee" 
characterization in some ways, yet he also brought valuable 
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experience to his position. Sackett was a prominent 
Kentucky businessman and Senator, appointed as Ambassador 
in part because he was perceived as a lame duck with little 
chance of reelection because of factional struggles within 
the Kentucky Republican party. However, he fulfilled the 
State Department's desire for an ambassador well versed in 
business matters, "because paramount issues of concern to 
the American embassy involved World War I reparations and 
trade relations with the Weimar Republic." (13) 
When he became Ambassador in 1929, Sackett replaced 
Jacob Gould Schurman, a former president and philosophy 
professor at Cornell University who had also served as 
minister to Greece and China. Despite his openly anti-
German views during World War I, Schurman had been 
perceived by State Department sources as being too pro-
German. ( 14) 
As a businessman, Sackett appeared more likely to 
represent and guard American interests. However, he later 
became very involved -- perhaps too involved -- in the 
affairs of his host country, and even exploited his 
personal access to President Hoover in a desperate effort 
to maintain the regime of his close friend and political 
ally, Chancellor Heinrich BrUning. (15) 
In his reporting on German politics, Sackett was 
assisted chiefly by Counselor of Embassy George A. Gordon, 
an old-fashioned career diplomat, "an industrious career 
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man with punctilio developed to the n..t.h. degree." (16) 
Gordon, known for his volatile temper, offered colorful 
descriptions of the Nazis but did not make much of an 
effort to meet with them and discern their motives. In 
this sense, the Americans may have been deprived of some of 
the needed analysis of the Nazi phenomenon. (17) 
One of the more perplexing problems surrounding German 
Nazism is that of the extent to which it resembled Italian 
Fascism as a revolutionary movement and later, as a 
governmental regime. Scholars continue to argue about 
whether the notion of a "generic Fascism" or a "fascist 
minimum" of criteria constituting a fascist government can 
be defended. (18) The question remains as to whether 
Nazism represented a separate, purely German movement apart 
from Italian Fascist antecedents, but in any case Hitler 
had certainly copied many of the outer trappings of 
Mussolini's Fascist regime-- the pageantry and raised-arm 
salute, the attempted Beer Hall Putsch that imitated the 
March on Rome, the hastily improvised and highly flexible 
political program, and the paramilitary squads of 
disaffected young men. (19) 
In the years before Hitler took power, Americans in 
general viewed his Nazi party as a Germanized version of 
Italian Fascism. An American study of German civic 
education, published within months of Hitler's 1933 
takeover, announced that "Fascism has triumphed in Germany" 
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and referred to the Nazis as "Fascists" throughout, using 
the word "Nazi" in quotation marks only. Most of the very 
early references to the Nazis by American diplomats called 
them the "German Fascists" until the colloquial term "Nazi" 
became common in American usage. (20) The conventional 
wisdom at the time was that Nazism was in some way an 
outgrowth of Italian Fascism. 
Yet during the immediate period of Hitler's rise to 
power, from the September 1930 election to Hitler's 
assumption of the chancellorship in January 1933, the 
American diplomats serving in Berlin made few direct 
comparisons between Hitler and Mussolini. At this time, 
when magazine pieces were referring to Hitler as "Germany's 
Would-Be Mussolini" and editorial cartoons showed him 
trying to follow in L1 ~·s footsteps, the American 
diplomats in Berlin were rejecting the notion that Nazism 
was closely related to Italian Fascism. (21) Parallels 
with Mussolini were seen by American diplomats in 
Washington, and would later come from diplomats who served 
in Germany after observing Mussolini's curtailment of civil 
liberties in Italy. Yet the Berlin embassy staff looked at 
the rising Nazis and saw something quite different than 
what Mussolini had created in Italy. 
In December 1931, the State Department in Washington 
sent the Berlin embassy a memorandum prepared by Herbert 
Feis, the Department's economic adviser. Feis's 
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observations were "based for the most part on newspaper 
reports" and were sent along because "We have not had any 
reports from the Embassy which have covered this question 
in just the same way as this memorandum approaches it," 
namely acknowledging the question of the connection between 
Nazism and Italian Fascism. The memorandum noted "The 
extent to which [Hitler's] program and ideas seem to 
resemble those of Fascist Italy." (22) 
In response to the State Department's request for 
"amplification or added information" for the memorandum, 
the Berlin Embassy responded as follows: 
The program of Fascist Italy really has little 
in common with that of the Nazis in Germany. 
Whereas Fascism is based on the idea of a 
cooperative state, Hitlerism is based on the 
old Hohenzollern and Prussian idea of strong 
centralization, imperialism and expansion 
The programs are similar in that 
both Fascism and Hitlerism depend on chauvinism 
and are opposed to emigration of their peoples. 
Whereas in the latter the element of anti-
Semitism plays a prominent role, it is entirely 
lacking in the former. The substance of 
Fascism is Mussolini's personality; the same 
applies in a much lesser degree to Hitlerism. 
Mussolini has the intellect and bearing of a 
martial hero; Hitler has the intellect of a 
crusading sectarian leader -- oblivious of 
dangers which surround him --but with intense 
energy and relentless in the pursuit of his 
aims. (23) 
In the above paragraph are several notable features of 
the Berlin Embassy view of Nazism. The first is the 
acceptance of the notion, widely believed at the time, that 
Hussolini had succeeded in the creation of a "corporate 
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state" that fundamentally organized labor and capital into 
a permanent, government-controlled bloc (something widely 
believed at the time but largely untrue) and that Hitler, 
if he came to power, would impose something radically 
different but as yet unknown. (24) 
Another notable feature is that the embassy staff saw 
Nazism as stemming less from Italian Fascism than from 
indigenously German centralist and militarist traditions. 
There is much truth in this observation, and Prussian 
militarism and monarchism seemed ready for a resurgence, 
considering the power of the Hugenberg Nationalists and 
other right-wing groups. Pierre de Lagarde Boal, the Chief 
of the Division of Western European Affairs, did not 
discount the possibility of a~ d'etat to restore a 
member of the imperial family. As he noted, 
"Discouragement with the republic is strong in Germany. If 
a German looks backward the first happy period his memory 
reaches is in the reign of the last Kaiser." (25) 
The most important component of the Berlin embassy 
analysis was the underestimation of Hitler's power as a 
leader -- an underestimation common to most observers up to 
and even after the Nazi takeover. The attitude was shared 
by many, including the ill-fated wheeler-dealers who 
brought Hitler into the government thinking they could 
"tame" him. The Berlin embassy staff definitely understood 
the extent to which Italian Fascism aaa Mussolini, but they 
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did not yet comprehend the extent to which the Nazi Party 
HAa Hitler. Hitler still seemed to have the traits of the 
rabble-rousing "sectarian leader" or "drummer" of the early 
1920s (26), while Mussolini had, in their view, the bearing 
of a "martial hero." Or even, perhaps, a statesman. Paul 
Scheffer, a Berliner Tageblatt reporter writing in Foreign 
Affairs in 1932, noted the overwrought nature of Hitler's 
oratory and his lack of a concrete program. While 
Mussolini himself had lacked a program in the beginning, 
Mussolini, he noted, "has been a statesman and not merely a 
stirrer of emotions." This was similar to Emil Ludwig's 
view, expressed the same year in Talks Kith Mussolini, that 
there was no German personality strong enough to impose a 
true Fascist regime in Germany --an obvious slap at Hitler, 
though his name was not mentioned. (27) 
The apparently chaotic nature of the Nazi movement 
made it even easier to arrive at this conclusion. There 
appeared to be other leaders within the party, including 
the left-leaning wing of Gregor Strasser, and these 
factions received a fair amount of attention. (28) 
Hitler's "legalistic" stance, his determination to enter 
the government by legal means, and the persistent efforts 
of other politicians to "tame" him, contributed to the 
impression that Hitler was a minor, blustering figure who 
could be handled by moderate German leaders if they would 
take the initiative to do so. (29) 
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Meanwhile, the "bolshevism bogey" remained a favorite 
of Foreign Minister Stresemann and other German leaders. 
One British despatch of 1928 tells of Stresemann describing 
the parties of the German far right as "supported by 
Italian money . . . . They called themselves sometimes 
Fascists, but they were really Communist . . . . (30) 
The British were inclined to take some of Stresemann's more 
alarmist statements with a grain of salt (31), and yet it 
is notable that in the late 1920s, British diplomats 
regularly described the Nazis as something more akin to 
Communists than Fascists. In 1929, the head of the British 
High Commission in the Rhineland, called the Nazis a 
"bolshevik-fascist organization," (32) and the Commission 
prohibited the wearing of the Nazi uniform within the 
British zone of occupation, though back at the Foreign 
Office it was observed that "The National Socialists are so 
near being ridiculous that it would be a pity to make 
martyrs of them." (33) In his 1929 report on the 
emergence of Nazi strength in local government elections, 
Harold Nicolson called the Nazis "red fascists, or left-
wing jingoes," and noted their appeal to youth with the 
"extreme idealism" and socialist elements of their baffling 
program. (34) As the Nazis, with their "vigorous, if 
utopian" program, siphoned ever more votes away from the 
other, reactionary German Nationalist groups, they 
increased the "danger to public order" through "the danger 
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of irresponsible fascism," apparently as opposed to 
Mussolini's responsible variety of fascism. (35) 
In 1929, the British were more seasoned observers of 
the Nazis than were the Americans. Sir Horace Rumbold, the 
British ambassador in Berlin, showed an early understanding 
that the National Socialist party was something entirely 
new in politics, mixing elements of Communism and Fascism 
in unheard-of combinations: 
.Herr Hitler's party aims at something 
new, something more bewildering than ever. It 
aims at nothing less than reconciling opposite 
political poles. The catchwords of the extreme 
right and of the extreme left are jumbled 
together in a manner which defies analysis. (38) 
The same expressions of exasperation would be echoed 
by American diplomats after the huge election victory of 
September 1930 made the Nazis a major force in German 
politics. The American charge d'affaires in Berlin, George 
A. Gordon, attributed the phenomenal September 1930 Nazi 
election gains to "disgust and recklessness." He was 
perplexed and appalled by the "extraordinarily confused, 
self-contradictory and opportunist character of their 
campaign." The Nazis were willing to say whatever was 
necessary to get votes, lauding private property when in 
areas dominated by the ultra-conservative Nationalist 
party, and then insisting when in Communist-dominated 
regions that they could offer "a Communist form of 
government directed by Germans rather than the same thing 
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under the guidance of Moscow." Gordon was perhaps most 
upset by what seemed to be Nazi advocacy of "repudiation 
pure and simple." (37) 
In keeping with this fear of repudiation, one of the 
more disturbing problems for the American diplomats was the 
lack of a coherent economic program among the Nazis. 
Gordon characterized the more extreme Nazi views as "half-
baked ideas approximating 'National Bolshevism.'" The 
destructiveness of Nazi views was also discomforting: 
The clearest thing about their plans is the 
negative aspect -- the idea of breaking down 
everything and then building it up differently 
-- an attractive program for dissatisfied 
people. (38) 
A few months later, Ambassador Frederic Sackett expressed 
the same sense of exasperation regarding the lack of a 
coherent Nazi program. Hitler's ideas on foreign policy 
and domestic finance were by no means as clear as the 
thoughts he had expressed regarding propaganda in ~ 
Kampf, and therefore, Sackett noted, "they are all the more 
elusive and difficult to combat. (39) 
During his tenure in Berlin, Ambassador Sackett had 
become an ardent supporter of Dr. Heinrich Bruning, German 
Chancellor from 1930 to 1932. Sackett admitted having "a 
rather intimate acquaintance" with Bruning, and made 
serious efforts to save his embattled government. As 
Sackett observed, Bruning's "detached air, coolness, 
evident steadiness of purpose and attention to detail" were 
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admirable qualities resembling those of President Hoover 
himself, but did not "catch the fancy of the masses." (40) 
H 
Among Bruning's objectives were the abolition of 
reparations and the resumption of Germany's pre-1914 place 
in the European power structure. These goals were 
certainly in keeping with German public opinion, but 
Bruning's lack of charisma and "austere appeals for 
sacrifices" could not capture the imagination of the German 
.people as Hitler was doing during the same period. (41) 
In December 1930, Sackett wrote a long personal letter 
to President Hoover regarding the problems of the BrJning 
government. In it he stressed the instability of Germany's 
financial status and the beleaguered situation of Bruning's 
government. Sackett, "perhaps being led by Br6'ning," also 
proposed an economic conference under Hoover's leadership. 
In one historian's view, 
It is apparent that Bruning wanted Americans 
to take the lead not only in the reparations 
problem, but in revision of the Versailles 
treaty, and offered nothing in return but his 
own continuation in power. (42) 
In this letter to Hoover, Sackett discounted the 
importance of the Nazis, whose astonishing election victory 
in September had just increased their Reichsta~ 
representation from 12 to 107 members. Instead, he 
emphasized BrUning's fear of "the Communistic menace, 
linked up as it is in each country with the directing heads 
in Russia." He also insisted that Brtining's views 
represented "the country's responsible thought," and 
therefore deserved attention. (43) 
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From the length and alarmist tone of Sackett's letter, 
it appears that he was attempting to get Hoover's attention 
and support for Bruning's goals. In this context, the 
Communists may have been a better attention-getter than the 
Nazis, whose unclear goals and "deliberate irrationality" 
offered American observers little more than a sense of 
confusion. (44) In any case, it was an unusual change of 
views for Sackett, who had previously dismissed the 
activities of the German Communists as "puerile." (45) 
Through Sackett, the BrUning government continued to 
pressure for an economic conference to deal with 
international economic problems. Sackett openly admitted 
to Sir Horace Rumbold, the British Ambassador in Berlin, 
that he had suggested the conference in order to help the 
Bruning government, and asked the British to do the same. 
Rumbold was willing to help, as both nations admired 
Bruning's stable leadership and feared all the possible 
alternatives to his government. (46) 
As the Depression intensified and further financial 
crises developed, the conference came closer to becoming a 
reality. In March 1931, Germany had attempted to improve 
its economy by creating a customs union with Austria in 
violation of the Versailles Treaty, which prohibited any 
kind of Anschluss (union) of Germany and Austria. Foreign 
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(particularly French) credits were removed from Austrian 
banks~ and the Creditanstalt~ the most important Austrian 
bank, collapsed in May 1931. Its fall was followed by a 
flight of capital from Germany, leading to further 
catastrophe and austerity. (47) 
These events were discussed at Chequers, the 
Prime Minister's country residence near London, in June of 
1931, and the conference was an important event in the 
progression leading to President Hoover's announcement of a 
one-year moratorium on the payment of reparation and war 
debts. In the period before the moratorium was declared, 
German diplomats did their best to convince the Americans 
that the Nazis, or worse yet the Communists, could take 
power if American inaction continued. At the Chequers 
Conference, the German Foreign Minister, Dr. Julius 
Curtius, said a change of government might bring in the 
"Hitlerites" or the Communists. The Nazis, as "untried men 
in office," might "disrupt the Reich and prepare the way 
for communism." (48) John Motley Morehead, the American 
minister in Sweden, was visited by the German minister, who 
informed him of the gravity of the German situation and 
said the nation would be "driven to Bolshevism before the 
end of the year" if Hoover's moratorium were not accepted 
by Germany's creditors. (49) 
Indeed, Ray Atherton, the American charge' d'affaires in 
London, had been correct when he predicted the Germans 
127 
would use the Chequers conference as a chance to "raise the 
bogey of a Germany torn on the one hand by Hitlerism and on 
the other by Bolshevism." (50) 
As economic conditions continued in a slump, the fears 
remained, and the British and the Americans tried to go 
easy on Germany. Reflecting some months later on the need 
for the moratorium, Secretary of State Stimson observed 
that Germany was "a good risk" because of "the character of 
her population, their technical skill, and their 
industry .... " Moreover, Germany was crucial to world 
financial stability and the containment of communism: 
In her position in the center of Europe, 
Germany in good health would be a bulwark of 
strength against instability and communism, 
while if she were allowed to fall the disaster 
would not be confined to her, but would 
certainly involve other nations and would 
greatly affect the financial systems of all 
the principal nations of the world including 
our own. (51) 
The worst fear of all, repudiation of debts, was discussed 
in a British memorandum of November 1931 regarding German 
finances: 
It should not be forgotten that if Germany 
is subjected to pressure which she considers 
intolerable, she will, in all probability, 
declare a moratorium for the whole of her 
foreign indebtedness and, while negotiations 
with her creditors are proceeding, will 
fall back upon the U.S.S.R. as a basis for raw 
material supply in exchange for industrial 
equipment. The dangers inherent in such a 
position, although it would not be a welcome 
one to Germany, are evident. (52) 
In the same memorandum, the British embassy's Berlin 
financial advisor predicted as many others had that 
the Nazis would be "tamed" and would soon be part of the 
government, whereas the parties of the left remained a 
threat to financial stability: 
Despite occasional outbreaks of flamboyance, he 
[Hitler] and his supporters will probably not 
prove particularly intransigent once they are 
in the Government . . . . Perhaps the greatest 
danger is that the Social Democrats and the 
Communists, who are gaining ground, might be 
driven to form a common front against the 
"Fascist menace," which might result in a 
political deadlock. Such a deadlock, or a 
really serious Communist gain, of which there 
is no sign at present, would obviously minimise 
the chances of an economic recovery and of 
an acceptable settlement of Germany's public 
and private foreign debts. (53) 
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Like most others, these British observers had been taken in 
by Hitler's facade of "legalism," which would play an ever 
greater role in 1932, the last year of the Weimar Republic. 
By May 1932, Chancellor BrUning had been removed from 
office thanks to the political machinations of General Kurt 
von Schleicher and others who believed the Nazis could be 
"tamed." Bruning was replaced by Franz von Papen, then 
Schleicher himself, and eventually Hitler at the end of 
January 1933. 
Within a few months after taking over as Chancellor, 
Hitler crushed all other parties and made the Reichstag 
irrelevant. The precedent for this had been set long 
before, however, by the BrUning government itself, which 
had created a system of government by emergency degree. 
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Ambassador Sackett reported to the State Department that "a 
complete transition to government by dictatorship" could 
occur without destroying the country, whose "banking, 
commerce and industry are already accustomed to function 
under a semi-dictatorial government." (54) This system 
absolved the political parties from responsibility for 
cooperation, but also offered a convenient pretext for the 
Nazis to move into the government and continue ruling 
through nonparliamentary, means. (55) 
While the baffling Nazi political platform became no 
more clear during 1932, the ascendancy of the party made it 
clear that they, and not the Communists, were to be the 
main force opposing the crumbling Bruning government and 
its equally impotent successors. Observers struggled 
valiantly to try to figure out what sort of role the Nazis 
would assume after years of complete opposition to the 
German quo. As Sir Horace Rumbold had observed a year-
before, "A party of negation, which advocates the tearing 
up of treaties and the repudiation of international 
obligations, cannot exist for an indefinite period." (56) 
The Americans and British diplomats were still alarmed 
about what they perceived as the "radical" Strasser and 
Goebbels wing of the Nazi party, which still appeared 
prominent. Sir Horace Rumbold noted in June 1932 that 
"There is little doubt that Goebbels, if he can pluck up 
the courage, will yet be a thorn in Hitler's side." (57) 
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In October, the British embassy in Berlin reported back to 
London about a pamphlet with a preface by Gregor Strasser~ 
which was full of socialist ideas resembling "national 
bolshevism." (58) 
In early 1932, Br~ning suggested to Ambassador Sackett 
that he might let the Nazis take the reins of power 
temporarily, if only to show the world their 
irresponsibility and lack of leadership ability. This was 
apparently another of Bruning's efforts to scare the 
Americans into helping him retain his position. While he 
made a point of openly rejecting the idea almost as soon as 
he proposed it, he had a bargaining chip in the Nazi party, 
since he could point to the two apparent factions within 
the party: the Hitler wing, then pursuing tactics of 
apparent "legalism," seemed fairly conservative, but the 
wing of Goebbels and Strasser was much more radical, and 
could ally itself with the communists, creating a group 
"strong enough to plunge the country into a national 
Communism of a disastrous type." Sackett reported back to 
the State Department that communism had been invoked "as a 
cry of wolf" too many times to be taken seriously, but 
insisted that if a responsible leader like Bruning feared 
it, there must be a good reason. (59) 
In their fear of the Strasser and Goebbels 
"Socialistic" wing of the party, a threat which never 
real+y materialized, the diplomats were possibly deceived 
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by one of Hitler#s main principles of leadership, the idea 
of "rival authorities." (80) Hitler made sure the Nazi 
party was flexible enough to appeal to all interests, and 
offered propaganda to appeal to all sectors, including of 
course those on the far left of the political spectrum, but 
he also made certain that his subordinates were unable to 
build any power base of their own. He did this by allowing 
redundant authorities to do the same thing in different 
places or circumstances, which appears to be what was going 
on in this case with Strasser and Goebbels -- both were 
working on propaganda and appealing to leftist sentiments, 
making Hitler appear more of a reasonable "legalist" by 
comparison. 
Another fear Sackett hinted at was one that had a 
precedent under Bolshevism -- the possible repudiation of 
debts (or, in this case, reparations): 
If the BrUning Government accepts liability 
for future reparation payments . . . irrespec-
tive of how far such payments are scaled down, 
the National Opposition [Nazi Party] seems 
actually ready to precipitate the "threatened" 
crises and to repudiate reparation payments. 
It is moreover allegedly willing to accept all 
consequences. ( 61) 
Sackett achieved little success in alerting the American 
leadership to the many dangers besetting Bruning. However, 
his fears regarding the repudiation of reparation payments 
did prove correct. The Lausanne Conference in the summer 
of 1932 scaled German reparations down to a minimum. Other 
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developments, including the Nazi takeover in 1933, 
intervened to create a situation in which both reparations 
and war debt payments had collapsed forever by 1934. As 
Dexter Perkins has noted: 
The essence of the matter is that here was a 
problem that the diplomats simply could not 
settle, one in which the prejudices and 
resistances of the masses were more powerful 
than any appeal to intelligence could be. 
And outside the gesture of the Hoover 
moratorium . . . American statesmanship in the 
last years of the debt question was never 
ready to face up to explaining to the American 
people the cold realities of the situation. (62) 
The British and American diplomats had discounted 
Hitler as a man who could not attain the heights of a 
Mussolini, yet timing, along with a sense of how to use 
chaos to advantage, was the key to his rise to the 
chancellorship and his shocking abuses of power once he 
took office. Sir Horace Rumbold seemingly understood this 
situation in 1928, when he spoke presciently of the 
paramilitary Stahlbelm group's limited chances of 
overthrowing the government, but noted the real possibility 
of an authoritarian takeover should circumstances change: 
The fascist movement in Italy, and the 
directorate movement in Spain, were rendered 
possible (a) by a pre-existing condition of 
social and political disintegration, (b) by the 
absence of any organized opposition. Neither 
of these two conditions is present in Germany, 
and it would require some serious and improbable 
accident to the political machine to create the 
circumstances necessary for any "march on 
Berlin." It is, of course, always possible 
that if the Stahlhelm leaders feel they are 
losing ground they might be so foolish as to 
attempt a coup de main. But so long as Germany 
remains economically, socially and politically 
as sound as she is to-day, there is no chance 
of any such Putsch being successful. (63) 
Within five years, the "serious and improbable accident" 
occurred in the form of the Great Depression and the 
increasing weakness of the republican political system. 
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The unlikely Putsch he described was no longer necessary to 
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CHAPTER VI 
BOLSHEVISM, FASCISM AND NAZISM - CONCLUSIONS 
In the years since World War II, it has become 
customary to speak of Fascism as a movement of very similar 
right-wing ideologies that swept over Europe between the 
two World Wars. There were Fascist regimes in Italy, 
Turkey, Poland, Austria, and Spain, but the most notorious 
of all the Fascists were the National Socialists or Nazis 
of Germany, who represented "the most radical, the most 
absolute manifestation of Fascism." (1) 
Today the word "Fascism" is often misused, and there 
is a tendency by some to see Fascism as a monolithic 
movement or apply the label to any authoritarian right-wing 
anti-communist group. However, even now, nearly 70 years 
after this ideology rose to prominence with Mussolini's 
March on Rome, "the essence of Fascism remains elusive." 
(2) 
One aspect of Fascism that must be considered is its 
genesis as an anti-Communist movement and its latent 
similarities with Communism. Ernst Nolte, a leading 
interpreter of Fascism, has defined the ideology as 
follows: 
Fascism is anti-Marxism which seeks to 
destroy the enemy by the evolvement of a 
radically opposed and yet related ideology and 
by the use of almost identical and yet 
typically modified methods, always, however, 
within the unyielding framework of national 
self-assertion and autonomy. 
This definition implies that without Marxism 
there is no fascism, that fascism is at the 
same time closer to and further from communism 
than is liberal anti-communism, that it 
necessarily shows at least an inclination 
toward a radical ideology, that fascism should 
never be said to exist in the absence of at 
least the rudiments of an organization and 
propaganda comparable to those of Marxism. (3) 
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American and British diplomats in interwar Europe were 
as perplexed as anyone today when trying to interpret the 
varieties of Fascism, but in the early 1930s they were more 
attuned to the differences than to the similarities between 
the two most important Fascist movements, those of Italy 
and Germany. There were legitimate reasons to see the two 
as dissimilar, and this tendency was reinforced by the fact 
that "Fascism differed within each country that fell victim 
to its baneful influence ... If the Nazis can be considered 
the most radical of the Fascist movements, it can also be 
argued that Mussolini's Italy was "less fascist" than other 
regimes that followed, since it never reached its professed 
level of total control over all aspects of Italian 
society. (4) Yet as the first of the Fascist national 
leaders and as a model for whom Hitler declared his 
admiration, it would seem that Mussolini and his regime 
offered the logical analogy for diplomats reporting on the 
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rise of the Nazis. 
Within a month of Hitler's ascent to the 
chancellorship, the parallels between the two regimes were 
obvious to at least one American diplomatic observer, Leon 
Dominian, the Consul General in Stuttgart. Dominian had 
served previously in Rome and immediately recognized 
similarities with Italian Fascism in the wholesale 
replacement of government officials with loyal Nazis, the 
curtailment of the press, and the suppression of opposition 
parties. (5) 
The Nazis, of course, went far beyond the Italian 
Fascists in their aggressiveness, swift takeover of the 
government, and excessive uses of power. In the early 
period of Hitler's rule, the Italians were still able to 
impress the American diplomats with their image as the more 
reasonable senior partner of the two Fascist regimes. They 
were much more concerned with worldwide public opinion, and 
thus their behavior offered quite a contrast with that of 
Hitler in November 1933 when Germany withdrew from the 
League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference. Consul 
General George Messersmith in Berlin, one of the more 
perceptive diplomatic observers of the Nazis, reported two 
incidents in which the Italian Ambassador, while trying to 
convince Hitler of the importance of remaining within these 
international organizations, was rewarded with extreme 
outbursts on Hitler's part: 
He [Hitler] has been deeply hurt in his personal 
pride . . . by the unfavorable comparisons which 
are being made between him and Mussolini and 
between German National Socialism and Italian 
Fascism. It is known, for instance, that in a 
recent interview which he had with the Italian 
Ambassador when the Ambassador gave him certain 
messages on behalf of Mussolini indicating 
particularly that Italy feared the extravagant 
and radical measures of National Socialism in 
Germany and the consequences of her withdrawal 
from the League and the Disarmament Conference, 
the Chancellor went into one of his frenzies and 
is said to have actually wept, stating that 
Mussolini had abandoned him because he was 
jealous of the place that German National 
Socialism was getting in the world and that 
after all, although Fascism had done a great 
deal for Italy, it was German National Socialism 
which was beginning to be the salvation not 
only of its country, but of the world. (6) 
A few days later, Messersmith reported another similar 
account of a Hitler outburst when the Italian Ambassador 
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informed him that German withdrawal from the League and the 
Disarmament Conference "would be looked upon with the 
greatest regret and concern by the Italian Government." 
The account of the first tantrum is attributed to "a most 
reliable source," and the second, while not from the 
Italian Ambassador, is "from a practically first hand and 
unimpeachable source." (7) The Italian Ambassador came 
out of the situation appearing by far the more reasonable 
of the two parties, and the Italians again succeeded in 
dissociating themselves from Hitler's worst excesses. 
These outbursts from Hitler are indicative of his 
growing independence and also his increasing rivalry with 
Mussolini for preeminence as a Fascist leader. However, 
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the Italians still held to their view of themselves as 
custodians of the international image of Fascism. In 
November 1933, the Italian Ambassador showed a sensitivity 
to public opinion regarding the increasing harassment and 
propaganda against women who smoked and used cosmetics: 
The movement was gaining such ground and 
arousing such ridicule that, as I learned from 
a well informed source, the Italian Ambassador 
brought the matter to the attention of Mr. 
Hitler, saying that these absurd manifestations 
of the National-Socialist movement in Germany 
were bringing Fascism into ridicule before the 
world and that ridicule was a dangerous weapon. (8) 
As late as 1934, Italy was still counted by 
Messersmith among the European powers that could be 
reasoned with, and could help reason with the Germans if 
necessary. In an April 1934 letter to William Phillips, he 
expressed hopes for the possible fall of Nazism and 
suggested possible outcomes: 
When the moment for action comes in Germany and 
when there ~ a change of regime here, I think 
we at home, England, France and Italy will have 
to make it clear to the German people that with 
their new Government we will be in a position to, 
and will be prepared to deal in a new way and 
help in the settlement of their economic and 
political problems. (9) 
One question that recurs for the observer of diplomatic 
reactions to Hitler's rise to power is that of why American 
and British diplomats would find the analogy of Bolshevism 
so much more tempting than that of Italian Fascism, at 
least in the beginning. Of course, one must take into 
account the way in which Hitler and Mussolini have become 
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inextricably linked in our postwar minds as the Fascist 
Axis powers of World War II -- a connection which obviously 
did not exist in the minds of observers in the early 1930s. 
Nevertheless, a survey of press accounts of the times shows 
that journalistic observers in America frequently viewed 
Hitler as a potential "new Mussolini" and definitely saw 
parallels between his leadership style and that of Ll ~~ 
parallels which seemed less noticeable to Anglo-American 
diplomats serving in Germany at the time. 
The concept of totalitarianism can be helpful in our 
understanding of the diplomatic viewpoint. The notion of 
totalitarianism did not become widely used in America until 
the late 1930s, but the diplomats in Berlin, while lacking 
the word itself, seemed to understand instinctively that 
what they were dealing with was a new phenomenon 
qualitatively different from the Fascism of Mussolini. 
National Socialism was indeed "a unique and radical kind of 
modern revolutionism," though its revolutionary nature was 
largely destructive. And seen within a framework of 
totalitarianism, Nazism did bear more resemblance to Soviet 
Bolshevism than to Italian Fascism: 
For much of the generation after the war, 
the concept of totalitarianism held vogue, 
likening Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union, 
however, much more than to Italy. The 
definition of totalitarianism has always been 
remarkably vague, and the most recent fad 
has been to deny that any such thing existed 
or exists. Since theorists of totalitarianism 
rarely get beyond such rudimentary and limited 
qualities as the single party, the use of 
terror, and mass mobilization, it is easy to 
argue either that many different kinds of 
regimes are totalitarian or conversely that 
none of them is perfectly total. 
Yet the concept of totalitarianism is both 
valid and useful if defined in the precise and 
literal sense of a state system that attempts 
to exercise total control over all significant 
aspects of all major national institutions, 
from the economy and armed forces to the 
judicial system, the churches, and culture. 
It has been seen that in this sense the 
Mussolini regime was not totalitarian at all, 
and the Hitler system also failed to achieve 
full totalitarianism, though in its final phase 
it drew nearer and nearer. (11) 
Stanley Payne, a leading observer of Fascism, has 
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noted the important ways in which Hitlerism differed from 
Mussolini's original Fascist ideology. Hitler based his 
ideology on race, while Mussolini's was founded on 
political and cultural nationalism. Hitler's one-man state 
differed greatly from Mussolini's "juridical state of 
semipluralism and formal law." The Nazi party played a far 
larger role in Germany than did the Fascist party in Italy. 
Nazism's violent anti-Semitism was a marked change from 
Italian Fascism's conventional early twentieth-century 
racism. Lastly, Mussolini's imperial designs never went 
beyond those of "traditional Italian 
nationalist/imperialist policy," while Hitler's foreign 
policy ultimately went beyond the old goals of German 
expansionism in an attempt at revolutionary restructuring 
of Europe itself. (12) 
In succumbing to the temptation to see Nazism as a 
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phenomenon akin to Bolshevism, the diplomats may not have 
been entirely incorrect. In the same chapter where he 
noted the dissimilarities between Nazism and Italian 
Fascism, Payne observed the following similarities between 
Nazism and Russian Communism: 
1. Frequent recognition by Hitler and various 
Nazi leaders (and also Mussolini) that 
their only revolutionary and ideological 
counterparts were to be found in Soviet 
Russia 
2. The founding of both National Socialism and 
Russian national communism on a 
revolutionary action theory which held 
that success in practice validated 
ideological innovation, as the Soviet Union 
progressively relinquished main aspects of 
classic Marxist theory 
3. Revolutionary doctrines of "constant 
struggle" 
4. Rigid elitism and the leadership principle: 
National Socialist was someone who followed 
Hitler; a Bolshevik was not necessarily a 
Marxist but someone who followed Lenin 
5. Espousal of the have-not, proletarian 
-nation theory, which Lenin adopted only 
after it had been introduced in Italy 
6. Construction of a one-party dictatorship 
independent of any particular class 
7. Major stress, not merely on a political 
militia (which was increasingly common in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries), but upon a party-army, with a 
regular army to be controlled by the 
party . 
8. Emphasis on autarchy and major (not merely 
partial) militarization ... promotion of 
revolutionary war whenever possible as an 
alternative to complete and balanced 
internal development 
9. An NEP phase of partial pluralism on the 
road to more complete dictatorship . 
10. International projection of a new 
ideological myth as an alternative to 
prevailing orthodoxies, capable of 
eliciting a not-insignificant inter-
national response; variants of Fascist and 
Nazi ideologies constituted the last 
notable ideological innovations in the 
modern world after Marxism (13) 
Along with the genuinely revolutionary nature of 
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Nazism and its very real parallels to Bolshevism, there are 
other factors to consider. Among these was the "Bolshevism 
bogey" so beloved of Stresemann and other Weimar leaders. 
In their struggle to gain foreign support, acceptance, and 
funds for the existing regime, they found it convenient to 
remind their benefactors of an enemy within, a dangerous, 
out-of-control political movement that could crush the 
existing system which, whatever its disadvantages, was at 
least nominally republican and provided a good atmosphere 
for international investment. The idea of a group of 
Fascists imitating Mussolini in Germany could hardly strike 
fear into the hearts of the British and the Americans, for 
Mussolini himself had also provided a good atmosphere for 
international investment. 
But the notion of the triumph of Bolshevism was 
another matter. The Bolsheviks were destroyers of 
capitalist economies, repudiators of debts, and sworn 
enemies of the business ideology and the status quo that 
the British and Americans openly espoused. As an 
attention-getter, the notion of so-called Fascists financed 
by Communists, or of wantonly destructive Nazis destroying 
Weimar society in time for the Communists to start their 
new regime on its ashes, was far more persuasive than the 
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thought of another dictatorial Fascist regime arising, 
which would be morally repellent, perhaps, but not 
necessarily a source of economic chaos. 
It was, above all, their uniformly hostile reaction to 
Bolshevism and their largely favorable reaction to Italian 
Fascism that ensured that, at least for a while, American 
and British diplomats would interpret early Nazi uprisings 
in terms of Communist or quasi-Communist action, rather 
than seeing Nazism as a very dangerous and revolutionary 
variant of Italian Fascism. Interestingly, the concept of 
"Red Fascism" took hold again in the post-World War II era 
of the early Cold War: 
Americans both before and after the Second 
World War casually and deliberately 
articulated distorted similarities between 
Nazi and Communist ideologies, German and 
Soviet foreign policies, authoritarian 
controls, and trade practices, and Hitler and 
Stalin. This popular analogy was a potent and 
pervasive notion that significantly shaped 
American perception of world events in the cold 
war. Once Russia was designated the "enemy" by 
American leaders, Americans transferred 
their hatred for Hitler's Germany to Stalin's 
Russia with considerable ease and persuasion. (14) 
Anti-Communism, as the leading feature of American 
foreign policy throughout most of the twentieth century, 
was bound to have an enormous effect on American diplomats 
observing the rise of Nazism, a philosophy so willfully 
confusing that it still baffles observers nearly forty 
years after its demise. If American and British diplomats 
sometimes saw Bolsheviks in Germany instead of Nazis, this 
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had much to do with the distorted conditions of public life 
in Germany in the early 1930s. Sir Horace Rumbold said it 
best in 1931: 
In attempting to appreciate possible 
developments in Germany under such conditions 
of strain one must remember that the situation 
can alter very rapidly. Elements which assume 
temporary importance may disappear, while 
others, not apparent to a superficial observer, 
may prove to have enduring value; and no 
analysis can hope to retain its validity for 
more than a comparatively limited period. (15) 
Given their existing fears and prejudices and the turbulent 
land of confusion and shadows that was Germany in the early 
1930s, American and British diplomats produced analyses as 
good as any that could be expected. Although they may have 
underestimated the dangers of Fascist ideology in Italy, 
they grasped the deeply revolutionary and destructive 
nature of National Socialism and thus described it 
frequently in terms of their only available synonym for 
revolution and destruction -- Russian Bolshevism. 
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